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PARTI Introduction
Common law historically recognized two defenses that served as total bars to
recovery in negligence suits: Contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
Contributory negligence is based on the principle of unreasonable conduct by the plaintiff
and assumption of the risk is based on a voluntary and knowing encounter with a risk
created by the defendant. In claiming such a bar to recovery, the defendant could
alternatively point out conduct by the plaintiff that the court could construe as either
unreasonable or as evincing an agreement to accept the risk of injury.
Before the advent of comparative fault principles, distinguishing the plaintiffs
behavior as either unreasonable or evincing agreement was not crucial to the outcome of
the case at bar as either served as a total bar to recovery. However, with the acceptance
of comparative fault, the unreasonable conduct of the plaintiff no longer serves as a
complete bar to recovery, instead reducing recovery (in many jurisdictions eliminating
recovery if the plaintiff acted in a more culpable manner than the defendant).
Assumption of risk, a corollary doctrine of contributory negligence, presently remains a
total bar to recovery even in those states that have adopted comparative fault.
With the advent of comparative fault, the distinction between plaintiffs fault and
plaintiffs agreement to encounter a risk has become crucial because it now means that
1
It was not necessary to distinguish among the different forms of assumption of risk before
comparative negligence came about because the outcome was always the same. Today it is a problem.
Prosser et al.. Torts §68 at 44 1 (5
th
ed. 1 984).
2the plaintiff either recovers (minus any fault attributable to the plaintiff) or doesn't
recover at all. Critical questions remain today: What should the courts do when
plaintiffs conduct could be characterized as both unreasonable and as an agreement to
accept a known danger? How do the courts determine whether the conduct was
unreasonable? How do the courts determine whether plaintiffs have knowingly and
voluntarily accepted a risk?
Attempts to address these questions have resulted in further distinction of
assumption of risk into two categories: Express and implied. Express assumption of
risk exists when there is an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant as in the form
of contract.
3
In this category, there is no question of the proper application of the
doctrine to bar recovery to the plaintiff.
On the contrary, implied assumption of risk is based on agreement implied from
the plaintiffs behavior. It bars recovery for injuries sustained when there is a voluntary
encounter with a defendant whose negligent behavior harms the plaintiff. Unlike the first
category where there is an express agreement to encounter a known risk, the
acquiescence in the second category on the plaintiffs part to assume such a risk comes
from the plaintiffs behavior when he encounters the known risk, not any express
agreement between plaintiff and defendant. Additionally, plaintiffs acquiescence under
~ See, for example, Spell, Stemming the Tide ofExpanding Liability: The Coexistence ofComparative
Negligence and Assumption ofRisk, 8 Miss. L. Rev. 159, 162 (1988).
3 Common examples include written waivers of liability between participants in sporting events and
the sponsor(s) of that event. Whalen v. BMW of North America, Inc., 864 F.Supp. 131 (S.D. Cal.
1994) highlights a common example of participants' releasing sponsors from harm during a sporting
event.
3this category of assumption of risk occurs despite plaintiff being aware of defendant's
negligent conduct. Implied assumption of risk is based on a form of agreement from
behavior by the plaintiff.4
Courts have had much difficulty under comparative fault principles with the
application of implied assumption of risk in negligence cases. The similarity of this
doctrine to the now outmoded theory of contributory negligence bears a closer
examination. If contributory negligence is no longer in use in 46 states6
, why does the
principle remain in certain negligence claims, where implied assumption of risk may be a
complete defense to the plaintiffs claim? This article examines the problems that this
4 The problem with these different types of assumptions of risk comes from examining the underlying
terms of "consent" and "acquiescence" which are synonyms for the word "agreement." They carry
with them diametrically opposed types of behavior in terms of the plaintiffs conduct when
encountering the defendant's negligently created situation.
Consent "is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing as in a
balance the good or evil on each side. It means voluntary agreement by a person in the possession and
exercise of sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice to do something proposed by
another." Black's Law Dictionary 305 (6th ed. 1991).
Acquiescence lies in the middle ground between consent and opposition. It is "passive
compliance or satisfaction; distinguished from avowed consent" and "differs from 'confirmation,'
which implies a deliberate act." Id, at 24.
5 57B Am. Jur. 2D Negligence §§ 1201-1206 (1989). Scholars, practitioners and jurists generally
agree that assumption of risk is inconsistent with the fault apportioning system of comparative
negligence. See also Annotation, Effect ofAdoption ofComparative Negligence Rules on Assumption
ofRisk, 16 A.L.R. 4
th
700, 703 (1982) (1999 supplement).
6 57BAm.Jur. 2d NEGLIGENCE §§ 1300 and 1751 (1989).
4category of assumption of risk presents in jurisdictions applying comparative fault
principles.
Consider the following cases.
A. The case of the thwarted verdict
Frank Harris was an experienced ironworks contractor working in Arkansas who
was injured when the boom crane he was working near came into contact with an
uninsulated power line. He took his employer to court7 , claiming that the power line
should have been de-energized to ensure safe working conditions. As a result of the trial
to recover for his injuries, the jury found that Mr. Harris was 1 5 percent at fault and the
defendant was 85 percent at fault. Accordingly, they apportioned damages of $90,000
o
among the parties in their respective manners of fault.
Unfortunately for Mr. Harris, the jury also found that he had assumed the risk of
his injuries. This assumption was the basis for a 15 percent reduction in Harris' damages.
Based on this particular finding, the District Court of Arkansas granted defendant's
motion to have the case dismissed notwithstanding the verdict.
In dismissing the case, the Court stated,
In candor. . .the jury probably did not know, or intend, that their finding on
the assumption of risk defense would constitute a complete bar to the
plaintiffs action. For the purposes of this opinion it is assumed that, if a
7
In a jurisdiction following comparative fault principles.
8
Harris v. Hercules Incorporated, 328 F.Supp. 360 (Ark. 1971). Hence, the jury found that Mr. Harris
should recover $76,500 ($90,000 minus 15 percent attributable to his fault).
9
Id.., at 363.
5hearing were permitted on this issue, it would result in the conclusion that
the jury believed, and intended, that their verdict would result in a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $90,000.00 reduced by 15% as in the
ordinary comparative negligence case.
* * *
The Court is impressed with plaintiffs argument and agrees that the
doctrine of assumption of risk as a complete bar is inconsistent with the
philosophy behind comparative negligence statutes [and the jury's
findings]. However, this Court is bound in this instance to apply the law
of the state of Arkansas. 10
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
B. The case of the sentient eight year old
Scott Harvard was an eight-year old boy who often played at his neighbor and
mother's fiance's house with Louis Sidre, a 10 year old boy. About two weeks after
Christmas they played together alone in Louis' house and decided to play with matches,
seeing who could hold the match longer. The game progressed into the living room near
a dried out Christmas tree. The tree caught on fire accidentally; Louis was able to crawl
on his belly toward an open window and escape. Scott's body was later found under a
bed in an adjacent room.
In directing the trial court to enter summary judgment for the defendant-parents of
Louis on various counts including negligence, the Court of Appeals of Georgia found that
the 8 year old boy had assumed the risk of his injuries and thus was responsible for his
Id., at 363-364.
455 F.2d 267 (8
th
Cir. 1972).
6own death. " The court's reliance on the elements of assumption of risk was based on the
presumption that a child of age eight has sufficient capacity to appreciate the chain of
events that could cause this type of danger.
13
The issue was precluded from reaching a
14jury.
C. The case of the thwarted verdict, II
Sammie Jones was operating a snow blower outside his home when the blower
jammed. He picked up a tree branch and shoved it into the blower to clear the snow out.
12
Stewart v. Harvard, et al., 239 Ga. App. 388, 520 S.E.2d 752 (1999).
13
Yet, no mention was made of actual recognition of harm related to the risks undertaken. In its
discussion, the court relied on Vaughn v. Pleasant, 266 Ga. 862, 471 S.E.2d 866 (1996), where the
elements of assumption of risk are: Actual knowledge of the danger; understanding and appreciating
the risks associated with such danger, and; voluntary exposure to the those risks.
Here, the surviving 10 year old's testimony illustrates that the only risk the boys appreciated
was the match producing heat on their fingers, leading them to blow the matches out. Id., at 756. The
court, in its ruling, implies that the boys were able to make a causal connection between a match head,
a Christmas tree that should have been taken down some time earlier, and death from smoke
inhalation.
14
Thus, a jury never heard the issue of whether the boy had sufficient faculty to appreciate such a risk
leading to his death.
Consider James Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 La.L.Rev. 17 (1961),
wherein he states, "Risk imparts a point of view, an estimate of the likelihood of a future result or
class of results. One may have knowledge of a present fact and yet fail to attach any significance to it
in terms of the likelihood of a future result." Id., at 24.
7Two girls walked by and, as Mr. Jones admired them with his hand in the maehine, he
stuck his right hand too far into the blower, severely injuring two fingers on his hand. ls
He readily admitted that he never read the brochure (at trial Mr. Jones conceded
that he did not read the operating manual "completely and thoroughly all the way
through") and knew that if he intentionally put his hand in the chute that he might hurt his
hand.
16 The jury, in splitting damages equally between the plaintiff and the defendant,
found that the plaintiff had voluntarily assumed the risk of harm to himself.
On defendant's motion to alter or amend judgment, the District Court in
Pennsylvania held that since conduct of plaintiff in pushing snow down emission chute of
snow thrower with twig from tree branch could only be characterized as negligence and
did not rise to level of waiver or consent, no charge on assumption of risk was warranted
as to negligence cause of action against manufacturer. The decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
17
D. The case of the well-chosen rule of law
Mr. Decker, a resident of Pennsylvania, bought some farm equipment in
Pennsylvania that was manufactured by the defendant in Wisconsin. Sustaining injuries
at his residence as a result of the use of the equipment, he sued in a diversity action in
Jones v. M.T.D. Products, Inc., 507 F.Supp. 8 (Penn. 1980).
16
Id., at 9.
649F.2d859(3dCir. 1981).
Wisconsin federal court. 18 Prior to the trial, the parties submitted briefs in support of
which rule of law should apply: Pennsylvania's rule of contributory negligence
19
(thus
barring the claim), or Wisconsin's rule of comparative negligence with no recognition of
assumption of risk.
It was no surprise then that the defendants argued that Pennsylvania law applied
with the plaintiff countermanding that the Wisconsin law applied. Wisconsin, which uses
an approach based on Leflar's "choice influencing factors" in governing choice of law,
applied its own law, finding that "this forum's governmental interests would be damaged
by the adoption of a rule under which no apportionment of fault is possible."
21
Basing its
decision on the history of equitable results achieved with comparative fault rather than
the Pennsylvania law of contributory negligence, the Court found that application of
18
Decker v. Fox River Tractor Co., 324 F.Supp. 1089 (Wis. 1971).
19
In effect at the time the case was decided.
20
Wisconsin use of Professor Leflar's approach uses a combination of five choice influencing factors:
Predictability of results; maintenance of interstate and international order; simplification of the
judicial task; advancement of the forum's governmental interests, and; application of the better rule of
law. Henna Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice ofLaw in the Courts, 34 Mercer L. Rev. 521
(1983).
In applying its own law to the case at bar, the Court relied heavily on the last two factors to
allow the plaintiff to proceed in his cause of action that might have otherwise been barred in
Pennsylvania. 324 F.Supp. 1089, 1090-2.
A relevant criticism of this approach is that it is indefinite and uncertain since the five factors
can be evaluated differently by different states. In practice, the forum usually selects as the better rule
its own law. 34 Mercer L. Rev. 521.
21 324 F.Supp. 1089, 1091.
9foreign state law would result in "den[ying] an injured person all compensation although
his responsibility for the accident and for the resulting injuries may be minor.""
In the four cases above, a problem becomes immediately clear. In the first three
cases, the court misapplied secondary assumption of risk because the doctrine retains
contributory negligence principles and is confusing to apply (in the first case assumption
of risk was used to deny the claim without regard to the findings of the jury). Such
confusion on the courts' part thwarts juries attempts to dispense corrective justice.2 In
the fourth case dealing with an issue of conflict of laws, the court refused to permit
assumption of risk principles to apply to the case before it went to trial. It claimed under
its choice of law rules that Wisconsin law is superior to the inequitable results that might
otherwise be achieved with the application of Pennsylvania law.
The difficulty in this application of secondary assumption of risk in courts
following comparative fault is determining two threshold issues: Whether comparative
fault or assumption of risk applies, and; whether the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily
encountered the defendant's negligently created risk so as to bar the claim. With regard
to the first issue, if comparative fault is applied then the jury gets to decide who is more
at fault. If the court decides to apply assumption of risk, the claim is barred altogether.
In the latter situation, the court may overlook whether one, or both, of the elements of
assumption of risk (knowing and voluntary) so as to prevent the case from going to the
22
Id., at 1092.
23
Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law As Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification For Jury
Adjudication, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2348 (1990). The article contains an excellent discussion of how rigid
principles of law (such as assumption of risk) hinder juries' attempts at corrective justice.
10
jury. The example of the sentient eight-year old diseussed above is an excellent example
of those elements being imputed onto the boy to bar the claim.
The same pitfalls apply if the plaintiff is deemed to have acquiesced to
encountering defendant's negligently created risk despite lack of an express agreement.
The court again will bar the claim. This is a problem because in contributory negligence
any fault by the plaintiff bars recovery, however slight that may be. In secondary
assumption of risk, the plaintiff is at fault for agreeing to encounter the risk, yet no
consideration is given to whether the plaintiffs acquiescence is lesser, equal to, or greater
than, the defendant's fault (remember—the defendant negligently created the risk). It is
assumed that plaintiffs behavior in agreement is greater than the defendant's fault.
So, courts following comparative fault rules will allow the jury to consider an
action where both parties are at fault, yet summarily bar plaintiffs claim where plaintiff
has, through behavior alone, waived any right of recovery.
Implied assumption of risk should be subsumed fully into comparative fault
principles. Unless an express agreement is found between the plaintiff and the defendant
and the agreement doesn't stem from negligent behavior on either part, the courts should
not bar recovery where both parties act unreasonable and yet one is said to have assumed
risks either not fully understood or with consequences greater than the assumption of risk
in a negligent manner entails. Finding assumption of risk based on an implication from
behavior is a factual determination; to have the court make this assessment as a matter of
law results in confusing and difficult to reconcile outcomes. The maxim, "volunti nonfit
II
injuria, " should only apply to an express agreement of willingness, not on behavior
alone.
Part II of this article discusses the common law background of assumption of risk
and how it fits into the scheme of negligence principles as an affirmative defense. Part II
also examines the background of assumption of risk and parallels its development
(erosion?) with contributory negligence principles. Part III looks at how assumption of
risk has been redefined and narrowed in its application as comparative fault principles
gained favor. It includes an examination of statutory erosion and in modern judicial
activism.
Next, Part IV examines how assumption of risk, particularly the secondary form,
conflicts with comparative fault and its underlying policy reasons. This examination will
include the tension between applying secondary assumption of risk and comparative fault
principles to a negligence suit.
Part V comprises the bulk of this article. It details a proposal for eliminating
secondary assumption of risk and proposes a comparative responsibility analysis to
resolve suits where each party was deemed negligent and one assumed the risks of the
other's act or omission. This proposal is based on risk-utility principles widely accepted
in other areas of the common law. Finally, Part VI will examine some criticisms of this
proposed analysis.
24 A commonly used Latin maxim meaning, "To the willing, no harm can be done." See, generally,
65A C.J.S. Negligence § 174(1) (1966).
PART II Background of Assumption of Risk
Assumption of the risk historically was used to balance the desire to protect
defendants from shifting risks onto unwilling plaintiffs with the need to protect plaintiffs
from forcing defendants to bear the costs of risks that were voluntarily assumed. 25
Developed as part of the common law of England and carried over to the United States
court system^ the doctrine of assumption of risk had particular vitality in jurisdictions
' Dean Wade, The Place ofAssumption ofthe Risk in the Law ofNegligence, 22 La.L.Rev. 5 (1961).
26
Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M & W 1, 150 Eng.Rep. 1030 (1837). A worker was injured by the negligence
of a fellow worker when an overloaded vehicle fell upon him. In suing his employer, he was denied
recovery. The court found that, by accepting employment, he had assumed the risk of his injuries
related to the working conditions that he could discover for himself.
See also Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 685, 170 Eng. Rep. 496 (1799). A seminal case
regarding the creation of the doctrine of contributory negligence which eventually led to the corollary
principle of assumption of risk was Butterfield v. Forrester, 1 1 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B.
1809).
The English Law Reform Act of 1945 replaced the rule with that of apportionment. Law
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. VI, c. 28. British scholars argue for the
application of a even narrower theory of assumption of risk whereby express consent is required in
order to waive a tort claim. See G. Williams, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 307-
308 (1951). They also argue that the assumption of risk defense should be rarely invoked because it
reflects consent to bearing the legal, in addition to the physical, risks. Id.
11
See, for example, Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 43 1 (Fla. 1973), where the Florida Supreme Court
declared that the general English common and statutory law was in full force and effect in Florida
except as it contradicted federal and state law. See also Johnson v. Hudson River R.R.Co., 75
Am.Dec. 375. 20 N.Y. 65(1859).
12
13
that followed contributory negligence principles. Its use was favored in the prevention of
jo
master-servant liability suits. In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., the Court
discussed the reason for the widespread use of this doctrine as seen in the context of the
Industrial Revolution
29
:
[Assumption of risk] can best be seen against the background of one
hundred years of master-servant tort doctrine. Assumption of risk is a
judicially created rule which was developed in response to the general
impulse of common law courts at the beginning of this period to insulate
the employer as much as possible from bearing the 'human overhead'
which is an inevitable part of the cost-to someone-of the doing of
industrialized business. The general purpose behind this development in
the common law seems to have been to give maximum freedom to
expanding industry. The assumption of risk doctrine for example was
attributed by this Court to "a rule of public policy, inasmuch as an
opposite doctrine would not only subject employers to considerable and
often ruinous responsibilities, thereby embarrassing all branches of
business[.]"30
28 318 U.S. 54, 63 S.Ct. 444 (1943).
29
During this time period England began to recognize that the doctrine was rooted in the notion of
free transferability of employment that was more concept than reality and thus decided to no longer
apply the doctrine. See, for example, Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption ofRisk, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 14, at
14-15(1907).
30 318 U.S. 54, 58-60.
14
Subsequently, the doctrine had been abolished by statutory amendment with
regard to cases involving federal workers' compensation.
31
Ironically, assumption of risk
continued its growth as part of the general body of tort law during the same time period
that state and federal laws under worker's compensation statutes abrogated recognition of
assumption of risk in the context of the master-servant relationship.
Even prior to the Congressional amendment that abolished assumption of risk, the
Supreme Court recognized that the distinction between assumption of risk and negligence
was "hazy" and expressed concern that "the servant's rights will be sacrificed by simply
charging him with assumption of the risk under another name."
A. Elements of assumption of risk
The elements of assumption of risk consist of the following: Actual knowledge of
the danger; appreciation or understanding of the risk, and; voluntary exposure to that risk.
Additionally, the harm associated with the outcome of the encounter must be within the
scope of the risk assumed.
Actual knowledge of the danger can range from encountering a risk that is
obviously known to the plaintiff to a defendant warning of a risk, yet the plaintiff
31
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C. §54, 45 U.S.C.A. §54, as amended in
1939.
32
2 F. Harper & F. James, THE LAW OF TORTS §2 1 .4 ( 1 956).
33 Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R., etc., R., Co., 205 U.S. 1, 12-13, 27 S.Ct. 407, 409 (1907).
34
471 S.E.2d866. See supra note 13.
15
deciding to encounter it anyway.
35 When it comes to the question of whether the plaintiff
encountered a danger that is so obvious such that she should be aware of it, it is mainly a
determination for the jury to decide whether the "obviousness" was high enough to
warrant that the plaintiff assumed a risk.
The element of appreciation of the risk, in its application, can either vitiate the
defense or create such a high hurdle for plaintiffs to clear that it is tantamount to
completely negating liability for the defendant. For example, requiring a precise level of
appreciation of risk on the plaintiffs part may make proof of any appreciation almost
impossible.
6
Conversely, finding that the plaintiff was aware that some (indeed, any)
risk exists will almost completely diminish liability on the defendant's part. 37
35
See, for example, Toley v. Kansas City Power & Light Company, 252 Kan. 205, 843 P.2d 248
(1992). Employees of the power company's coal generation plant sued for acid rain damage to their
parked vehicles at the plant site. In affirming denial of recovery by the trial court, the court noted that
the employer had posted a sign saying, in part, "parking your motor vehicles at or near the plant site is
at your own risk [due to sulphurous emissions]." Id., at 216.
The court went on to note that plaintiffs should have known of the risks of acid rain damage
(even without a posted sign) because of the 'obviousness' of the damage.
56
See, for example, Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Company, 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977). A conveyor
belt maintenance operator received damages for his lost left arm. It was lost in some belt driven
machinery when he climbed atop of the belt and stuck his arm in the high pulley.
The plaintiff acknowledged that there was some level of risk involved with sticking his arm
into the machinery but did not think it was 'that ' dangerous. The plaintiffs expert witness testified
that, while the plaintiff was aware of the potential risk of his actions, it was stored in his long-term
memory. During the attempted repair, the expert testified, the plaintiff was in a state of relying on his
short-term memory where such an appreciation of the risk may not have been stored. Id., at 538.
37
James Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 La.L.Rev. 17 (1961). The author notes
that requiring knowledge of the exact level of risk would demand an "exact prevision of the future that
16
The third element, voluntary exposure to the risk relies on complete acquiescence
on the plaintiffs part in deciding on proceeding with a certain course of action that may
involve a risk. "The plaintiff is barred from recovery only if [her] choice [to incur the
risk] is a free and voluntary one." 3 * Coercion or duress negate this element. 39
Finally, the harm must be within the scope of the risk assumed. This is a general
principle that prevents a defendant from claiming that plaintiffs damages resulting from
injury of type A are a result of encountering a risk that could have only produced an
injury of type B. It can also be stated as the element that prevents a causal chain of
events from becoming so long and twisted that the ultimate injury resulting from a risk
assumed is tentatively, at best, related to the actual risk assumed. 40
B. Forms of assumption of risk41
Assumption of risk comes in two major forms42 : Express and implied. In the
implied form there are two additional subsets of assumption of risk: Primary and
would displace any notion of risk." Hence, requiring knowledge of any level of risk would result in
assumption of risk cases being resolved in favor of the defendant who raises the defense.
38 Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton On The Law Of Torts, § 68 at 490 (5 th ed. 1 984).
59
See, for example, Marshall v. Ranne, 51 1 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974). A farmer, facing the prospect of
possible attack by a known vicious boar, could have remained in a farmhouse or gone outside to get in
his car to return home. When he went to his car, he was bitten on the hand. The court held, "The
latter alternative [choice] was forced upon him against his will[.]" Id., at 259.
40
See supra note 13.
41
Refer to the chart in Appendix A.
42
See supra note 2.
17
secondary,
43
with secondary implied assumption of risk having two additional subsets,
reasonable and unreasonable, depending on the plaintiffs behavior at the time an injury
is incurred.
The express and primary implied categorizations are best considered as a form of
contract.
44
In this theory, a prior agreement of release from liability for damages
sustained during the agreed upon activity is entered into between the plaintiff and the
defendant. The consequences of this agreement are such that the risk of negligence shifts
43
See, for example, Minnesota's adoption of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. The statute says in
relevant part:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless
toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict
tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of
risk not constituting an express consent or primary assumption of risk, misuse of a
product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages, and the
defense of complicity under section 340A.801. Legal requirements of causal relation
apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault. The doctrine of
last clear chance is abolished.
M.S.A. §604.01
In adopting the principle of comparative fault, Minnesota created a two-prong definition of
assumption of risk: Primary and unreasonable, or secondary. See also, Springrose v. Wilmore, 292
Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
44
John L. Diamond, Assumption ofrisk after comparative negligence: Integrating Contract Theory
into Tort Doctrine, 52 Ohio St. L. J. 717. This theory of construing primary assumption of risk as a
contract theory is supported by Whalen v. BMW of North America, Inc., 864 F.Supp. 131 (S.D. Cal
1994), where the court held that assumption of risk, although not ordinarily available in admiralty
cases, could be applied in this action because a contract to do so existed.
18
from the defendant to the plaintiff.
45
Defendant is deemed relieved of the duty or burden
of use of reasonable care toward the plaintiff.
In implied secondary assumption of risk, although no express agreement exists,
there exists a strong implication of prior assent because the plaintiff is fully cognizant of
and voluntarily encounters a risk.
46 The consequences of this implication are similar to
express assumption of risk, with plaintiffs actions having absolved defendant of any duty
owed toward him. Thus, in seeking to prove that secondary assumption of risk has
occurred by the plaintiff, the defendant must prove that the plaintiff encountered a known
risk in a voluntary manner.
47
These theories are defeated where public policy considerations outweigh these
types of agreements, contrary to libertarians who would hold that agreements are in most
circumstances enforceable. Also, the express and primary implied agreements do not
give the defendant leeway to act in a gross, wanton or reckless manner toward the
plaintiff.
45
Prosser, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 439-441 § 68 (4th ed. 1981) (hereinafter referred to as
TORTS); 2 F. Harper & F. James, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 1 62- 1 1 67 §2 1 . 1 ( 1 956).
46 Arthur Best, Comparative Negligence: Law and Practice (1993).
47
See, for example, Vaughn v. Pleasant, 266 Ga. 862, 471 S.E.2d 866 (1996). The elements of
assumption of risk consist of the following: Actual knowledge of the danger; appreciation or
understanding of the risk, and; voluntary exposure to that risk. Id., at 864.
48
Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 Yale L.J. 427 (1980). There is agreement
among libertarian thinkers that assumption of risk, in its express form, should be never be abrogated
and indeed could be expanded beyond formal written contract principles.
19
In contrast, implied secondary assumption of risk with its subsets of reasonable
and unreasonable theories, is "a thorn in the judicial side."
49 As stated above, it occurs
when a plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily meets a risk negligently created by the
defendant and bars recovery by the plaintiff. Furthermore, the two subsets, reasonable
and unreasonable secondary assumption of risk, attempt to categorize the plaintiffs
conduct so as to either allow recovery or not, based on the plaintiffs reasonableness in
encountering the danger. 50 In its application by courts, it is very similar to the principles
of contributory negligence because fault on the plaintiffs part is factored into the court's
consideration of whether to allow plaintiff to recover damages.^ In contrast, no inquiry
is made into the defendant's behavior regarding the creation of the occurrence.
In the reasonable subcategory, the plaintiffs conduct in encountering the
negligently created risk by the defendant will not bar or reduce damages in comparative
en
.
fault jurisdictions. " But, if the plaintiff acted unreasonably, this is determined to be
49
Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 1977).
50
E. Todd Presnell, Torts—Perez v. McConkey: The Tennessee Supreme Court Abolishes Implied
Assumption ofRisk After the Adoption ofComparative Fault in Mclntyre, 25 U.Mem. L.Rev. 291
(1994).
51
In fact, Prosser once pointed out that the difference between assumption of risk and contributory
negligence is where "assumption of risk is a matter of knowledge of the danger and intelligent
acquiescence in it, while contributory negligence is a matter of some fault or departure from the
standard of reasonable conduct, however unwilling or protesting the plaintiff may be." Robert v.
King, 253 N.C. 571, 117 S.E.2d 421 (1960). Apparently Prosser was discussing assumption of risk
before the many subsets and variations came about as secondary assumption of risk carries with it the
elements of fault on the plaintiffs part, much like the principles of contributory negligence.
20
unreasonable secondary assumption of risk and the plaintiff will have his damages either
barred completely or reduced according to the jury's apportionment of fault attributed to
the plaintiff.
53
Some states, in adopting comparative fault principles, have abrogated the use of
implied assumption of risk. 54
C. Secondary assumption of risk retains viability despite disappearance of
contributory negligence
Ever since the Mississippi legislature enacted a statute in 1910 eliminating the use
of contributory negligence and giving comparative negligence principles its first foray
into the courts of America, 53 more than forty five other states and the District of
52
Id.
>3
See, generally. Spell, Stemming the Tide of Expanding Liability: The Coexistence of Comparative
Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 64 Miss. L.J. 753 (1988). In "pure" comparative fault
jurisdictions, the plaintiff always recovers damages even if he is found to be more at fault than the
defendant so long he is not 100 percent at fault. The damages recovered are equal to the percentage of
the defendant's fault.
In "modified" comparative fault jurisdictions, the plaintiff will recover damages only if his
fault is not greater than 50 percent. Twenty jurisdictions have a "not greater than" modified
comparative fault statute where a "50/50 split" of damages is possible. In both "modified" and "not
greater than" jurisdictions, if plaintiff is permitted recovery, she is awarded damages in the percentage
attributable to the defendant's fault.
5
E. Todd Presnell, Torts—Perez v. McConkey: The Tennessee Supreme Court Abolishes Implied
Assumption ofRisk After the Adoption ofComparative Fault in Mclntyre, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 291
(1994).
21
Columbia have enacted similar measures of their own. Comparative fault principles
have predominated over contributory negligence principles because the end result is
viewed as more equitable, the cost of litigation is spread over a broader group of
persons (and thus subsuming individual costs), and a plaintiff avoids having his cause of
action being completely barred from recovery however slight his own fault may be.
However, the theory of assumption of risk, whose own history neatly meshes with
the principles of contributory negligence and reached popularity through now outmoded
CO
master-servant doctrines," still lives on to this day. In its present form, assumption of
risk has taken on different lives and meanings, much to the confusion of the courts and
the juries that sit in them. 59
55
Act of Apr. 16, 1910, ch. 135, 1910 Miss. Laws 125 (later amended as Miss. Code Ann. S 11-7-15
(1972). Some commentators have suggested that Mississippi did in fact do away with assumption of
risk four years later when the legislature passed a law eliminating the defense in employer-employee
relationships. Since this was only the type of tort that used this defense at the time, it is argued that
the legislative intent was to completely abrogate assumption of risk, not just limit its application. See
Wilder, Assumption ofRisk in Mississippi—Timefor a Change?, 44 Miss. L. J. 452 (1973).
56
Jim Hasenfus, The Role ofRecklessness in American Systems ofComparative Fault, 43 Ohio St. L.J.
399(1982).
57
In Louisville Nashville R. Co. v Fisher, 357 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1962), the court, in reversing an
award for the plaintiff and ruling for the defendant railroad, held that the plaintiffs fault in not being
able to see through overgrown weeds at a crossing barred recovery. The court admitted however that
a more just result would have been achieved if it were able to apply comparative negligence rules.
58
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S.Ct. 444 (1943).
59
Spell, Stemming the Tide ofExpanding Liability: The Coexistence ofComparative Negligence and
Assumption ofRisk, 64 Miss. L.J. 753 (1988); Rosenlund & Killion, Once a Wicked Sister: The
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Conceptual differences between assumption of risk and contributory negligence
are three-fold: First, assumption of risk deals with knowledge of the danger and voluntary
acquiescence in it, but contributory negligence is simply a departure from the standard of
reasonable care (in an unknowing and unsuspecting manner); second, due to these
different behaviors, assumption of risk is viewed as a subjective standard (what did the
plaintiff actually know at the time of the injury) while contributory negligence is based
on an objective "reasonable person" standard; third, assumption of risk relies on a
presuming adventurousness on the plaintiffs part while contributory negligence relies
upon reasonableness.
Attempts have been made to distinguish these conceptual differences. For
example, in Tennessee, assumption of risk is based on consent (whether expressed or
Continuing Role ofAssumption ofRisk Under Comparative Fault in California, 20 U.S.F.L.Rev. 225
(1986).
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter once stated: "[T]he phrase 'assumption of risk' is an excellent
illustration of the extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a
literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishing it as a legal
formula, indiscriminately used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas." 318 U.S. 54,
68 (1943). Frankfurter concurring opinion. See also generally, Note, Symposium: Assumption ofRisk,
22 La. L. Rev. 1 (1961).
For an amusing analogy of assumption of risk with a mysterious element called "phlogiston,"
see Wex S. Malone, Foreword—The Kid Who Got Left Out, 22 La.L.Rev. 1 (1961). Phlogiston was
an imaginary element believed to be responsible for fire; once it was discovered that it never existed,
meaningful analysis of the causation of fire was undertaken.
60
See Riley v. Davidson Construction Co., 381 Mass. 432, 409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Blum v.
Brichacek, 191 Neb. 457, 215 N.W.2d 888 (1974).
23
implied) and the ''keystone" to this consent is knowledge. 61 Contributory negligence is
based on the issue of whether a reasonably prudent man would or should have discovered
the danger and avoided it. However, in attempting to delineate the differences, courts
acknowledge that the same facts in a case may be relevant to both defenses. 63
As contributory negligence waned, 64 the principal of secondary (implied)
assumption of risk remained. This did not occur without tension from the courts and
commentators. Many courts, while recognizing that assumption of the risk is a doctrine
that evolved from contributory negligence, merged the doctrine with comparative fault by
labeling wrongdoing on the plaintiffs part as contributory negligence in apportioning
damages among the parties. 3 This merger however creates the confusion.
In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 66 the California court pronounced that comparative fault
replaced contributory negligence; thus, all its subsidiary forms were also no longer
61
Mclntyre v. Ballantine, 833 S.W. 2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).
62
Supra, note 53. Tennessee defines assumption of risk with the same elements as many other states.
See, for example, Vaughn v. Pleasant, supra notes 12 and 44.
63
Supra note 56.
64
As a complete defense, contributory negligence has disappeared in England, continental Europe,
Canada, New Zealand, Western Australia and forty-six states of America. See Howard J. Alperin,
Annotation, Comment Note—The Doctrine ofComparative Negligence and its Relation to the
Doctrine ofContributory Negligence, 32 A.L.RJd 463, 469 (1970) (1999 supplement).
65
Matthew J. Toddy, Assumption ofRisk Merged with Contributory Negligence: Anderson v.
Ceccardi, 45 Ohio St. L. J. 1059 (1984).
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recognized. As such, assumption of the risk could only be introduced at trial in attempt
by the defense to ameliorate damages, not in an attempt to seek a total bar to the cause of
action.
6
Unfortunately, this clear statement with regard to assumption of the risk has not
been picked up on by other jurisdictions.
In Knight v. Jewett, 6 * and in Anderson v. Ceccardi, cases which attempted to
resolve this conflict, the courts simply decided to have the knowledge element of
assumption of the risk be the determinative factor in deciding whether a plaintiff
encountering a known risk can recover. Anderson reached a somewhat contradictory
conclusion: Comparative fault had replaced contributory negligence yet the court had
this to say about assumption of risk:
[C]onduct previously considered assumption of the risk by the plaintiff
shall be considered by the trier of fact under the phrase 'contributory
negligence of the person bringing the action' [in the present suit]. 71
66
13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975).
67
The Court stated: "The defense of assumption of the risk is also abolished to the extent that it is
merely a variant of the former doctrine of contributory negligence; assumption of the risk is to be
subsumed under the general process of assessing liability in proportion to negligence." Id.
68
3 Cal. 4
th
296, 834 P.2d 696 (1992).
69
6 Ohio St. 3d 1 10, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983).
70 [Tjhere is no merit to the... general claim that simply because a person is aware an activity involves
a risk of harm that may arise from another's negligence and voluntarily proceeds to participate in that
activity despite such knowledge, that person should be barred from obtaining any recovery on the
theory that he or she impliedly consented to the risk of harm. 3 Cal. 4
th
296, 312, 834 P.2d 696, 706
(1992). Note that the defendant prevailed anyway on the theory of assumption of risk.
71
6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983).
25
In sum, in those courts that have not followed the clarity of Yellow Cab, the only
true distinction separating assumption of risk from contributory negligence is merely the
scrutiny of whether a subjective inquiry (of plaintiff s awareness or knowledge) should
be used versus an objective inquiry (reasonable person standard). Consequently, the
subjective standard remains and is applied in a very subjective manner.
72
The significant difference is likely to be one between the risks in fact known to the plaintiff and
those risks which he should have discovered through the exercise of ordinary care. Prosser, TORTS,
441 §68. Plainly, this is a subjective versus objective inquiry.
PART III The Rise of Comparative Fault and the Erosion of Assumption of Risk
A. The introduction of comparative fault
Comparative fault gained favor in recent decades because of its underlying
notions of fairness and ease of application for the jury system (although it initially was
favored in those civil code jurisdictions that do not use juries). Too often, a plaintiffs
slight fault on his own was plead as contributory negligence by the defendant and the
plaintiff was barred from any recovery, however slight that fault may have been. This
was viewed as injustice because, as it has been said, "the injured man is in all probability,
for the very reason of his injury, the less able of the two to bear the financial burden of
his loss[.]"
To ameliorate this effect, especially in suits involving employees attempting some
form of recompensation from the employer for an injury incurred while on the job, state
legislators and the federal government began enacting statutes to implement comparative
' 3
For example, in Germany a Supreme Court decision overruled previous decisions that allowed an
"all-or-nothing" approach where contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff could be plead.
The court favored a more flexible approach; in their decision they returned to the original intent of the
statute that implemented comparative fault type of negligence suits. BGHZ 34, 355 (363) (Supreme
Court of Germany).
The relevant code section provides:
If any fault of the injured party has contributed to causing the damage, the obligation
to compensate the injured party and the extent of the compensation to be made
depends upon the circumstances!.]
§ 254 BGB (F.R.G.) (German Civil Code).
74
Prosser, TORTS, 433 §67.
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27
fault principles. For example, the Federal Employer Liability Act (FELA),75 while still
using the language of "contributory negligence," is structured in such a way so as to have
the statute have the effect of comparative fault.
6 Many states adopted workers'
compensation statutes following implementation of FELA and Supreme Court decisions
upholding their validity to reach this result in a similar manner. An attempt to broaden
75
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 53 Stat. 1404. 45 U.S.C. §54, 45 U.S.C.A. §54, as amended in
1939.
76
In 1939 Congress specifically amended the Act to eliminate the use of assumption of risk. See,
supra note 71.
77
Alperin, "Doctrine of Contributory Negligence...," 32 A.L.R. 3d 463 (1970).
See also Philip D. Oliver, Once is Enough: A Proposed Bar ofthe Injured Employee 's
Cause ofAction Against A Third Party, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 1 17 (1989). In his discussion of the
historical background of workers' compensation statutes, he notes:
In 1904, Massachusetts established a commission on employer liability in response to
increasing industrial injuries and restrictive tort remedies, the publication of a full
account of the German system of strict liability for employers, and the enactment of
the first British Compensation Act in 1897. Other states followed Massachusetts'
lead.
* * *
In 1910, representatives of commissions from Congress and nine states drafted a
Uniform Workmen's Compensation Law. Some early statutes were held
unconstitutional. In the most important of these decisions, the New York Court of
Appeals held that a provision for damages in the absence of fault constituted
deprivation of property without due process of law, in violation of the state and
federal constitutions. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431
(1911). Any problem posed by the New York Constitution was met by a 1913
amendment. See 4 N.Y. Laws app., at 2492 (1913) (amending New York state
constitution by adding art. I, § 19 (now § 18)). Shortly thereafter, a series of
decisions by the United States Supreme Court resolved the federal constitutional
28
the effect of comparative fault by the American Law Institute to weakening the
application of secondary assumption of the risk was similarly undertaken. 78 All of these
developments have occurred rather rapidly in the span of the past few decades, building
70
on the federal legislative activity at the turn of the century.
Also, courts attempted to use the doctrine of last clear chance to keep defendants
from avoiding the costs of the injuries resulting from their actions. This caused even
more confusion however as the courts had difficulty in applying this concept. As a result,
the doctrine has been declining in favor while still being restated in a variety of different
O 1
ways and constructions. This result is most likely because assumption of risk was
viewed as a concept separate from comparative fault and thus not readily replaced by
issue by upholding workers' compensation statutes. See, e.g., Mountain Timber Co.
v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S.Ct. 260 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S.
210, 37 S.Ct. 255 (1917); New York R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S.Ct. 247
(1917).
* * *
By 1920, all but eight states had compensation acts. Hawaii became the fiftieth state
to adopt the system in 1963.
Id., at 118 and footnote 24.
78
See the Model Comparative Fault Statute, infra note 152.
19
See, supra note 3 1
.
Maclntyre, The Rationale ofLast Clear Chance, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1225 (1940). See also Ackerman
v. James, 200 N.W.2d 818 (Iowa 1972), which has a discussion of different cases that use this
doctrine.
81
James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 Yale L.J. 704 (1938).
29
those statutes implementing eomparative fault. Even with some courts subsuming
assumption oi risk into comparative fault confusion still exists.
During this period of mitigating the harsh results of contributory negligence and
narrowing the aspects of its corollary contributions, assumption of risk began its decline.
As discussed above, this erosion occurred in several different areas: the adoption of
worker's compensation and other state and federal employment statutes, the use of last
clear chance, an inquiry into whether the elements of assumption of risk were ever
present during the cause of action in question and, most significantly, with the
increasing adoption of comparative fault.
Comparative fault has its roots in the theory of apportionment of damages. Many
critics of contributory negligence and its correlating doctrines (last clear chance,
assumption of risk, et al.) looked to the examples in use by civil code jurisdictions as a
way of replacing what they saw as a complicated and unfair doctrine. The suggestion:
Implement apportionment of damages, the so-called comparative fault system.
Critics of this system wasted little time in responding. 84 A principle criticism
stems from the philosophy that underscored the idea behind contributory negligence:
Comparative fault reduces the promotion of caution by the plaintiff who should be
82 r •
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975).
S3
See, supra note 64.
84 Comparative Negligence Symposium, 23 Mem. St. U.L.Rev. (1992).
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responsible tor his own safety. ' Another critieism of comparative negligence is distrust
ofjuries, ° who are viewed by some as willing to award damages for every cause of
action they sit in on. Furthermore, such deliberations, as viewed by these same critics,
come under fire as the jury is viewed as ill-equipped to make the right decisions. 87
B. Rethinking the corollary contributions of contributory negligence
With the adoption of comparative fault courts have re-examined two corollaries of
contributory negligence: assumption of risk and the "last clear chance."* 8 With the last
clear chance doctrine (wherein a plaintiff may still recover despite his negligence if the
defendant had a final opportunity to avoid occurrence of the injury) the courts have
ceased to recognize its application. This is mainly due to the fact that the doctrine was
3d One study suggests that this may not be true. See Mole and Wilson, A Study ofComparative
Negligence, 17 Corn. L. Q. 333, 344 (1933).
6
David W. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses,
and Affirmative Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability in Louisiana, 44 La. L. Rev. 1341 (1982).
7
Id., at 1395. Mistrust ofjuries is also discussed in Wex S. Malone, Comparative Negligence—
Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 La. L. Rev. 125, 144 (1945). Yet compare this perception against
the jury's findings in Harris v. Hercules Incorporated and the court's subsequent action on the verdict,
supra note 7.
iS
Although some courts have applied the new comparative fault standards without addressing the
issues of assumption of risk, res ipsa loquitor and last clear chance. See, generally, Dominick Vetri,
Communicating Between the Planets: Law Reform for the Twenty-First Century, 34 Willamette L.
Rev. 169(1998).
89 Bokhoven v. Klinker, 474 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1991).
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seen as a possible method of ameliorating the harsh "all or nothing" rule of contributory
negligence. With the decline of contributory negligence so too goes last clear chance. 90
Not so with secondary assumption of risk; it has remained and courts have been
struggling to merge this doctrine into comparative fault. That this problem exists today is
remarkable in light of the fact that the Uniform Comparative Fault Act called for the
abolishment, at least in part, of assumption of risk.
91
Part of the problem stems from the
fact that secondary assumption of risk and contributory negligence, despite some
differences, overlap. Both doctrines look to the plaintiffs behavior to determine whether
it played a role in causing his own injury. " The significant difference is likely to be one
between the risks in fact known to the plaintiff and those risks which he should have
discovered through the exercise of ordinary care.
93
This is contrary to last clear chance
where the final analysis was centered on defendant's behavior before plaintiff was
?0 Of course, there are always exceptions. See Southern Railway v. Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co., 376
F.Supp. 96 (S.D. Ga. 1974), where the Georgia courts still adhere to the last clear chance doctrine as
an affirmative defense.
91 A model statute, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act §l(b) (1977), states that certain defenses used
to preclude recovery, including "unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable
express consent," would only reduce damages in the amount apportioned to plaintiffs fault. See,
infra note 152.
92
[In a case where the plaintiff is deemed to have acted in a negligent manner] his conduct is a form
of contributory negligence, in which the negligence consists in making the wrong choice and
voluntarily encountering a known unreasonable risk. In such cases it is clear that the defenses of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence overlap, and are as intersecting circles... [.]" Prosser,
TORTS 441 §68.
93
Id., at 440-442.
,
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injured. As stated earlier, both plaintiff and defendant share some degree of fault but if
the plaintiff is determined to be at fault in a manner deemed permissive94 on his part, then
his suit is barred from recovery.
Thus it makes sense that some courts have narrowed the application of
assumption of risk into primary and express variations only. With these two theories,
plaintiff is expressly or implicitly agreeing to relieve defendant of his duty of care
without acting in a negligent manner in doing so (refer to chart at end of article). Some
courts have gone even further and abolished assumption of risk completely as a defense,
holding that the similarities between assumption of risk and the outmoded contributory
negligence principles are so intertwined that statutory elimination of contributory
negligence does away with assumption of risk as well. 5
Statutorily, this abrogation or narrowing of assumption of risk has occurred on the
federal and state level. For example, the Federal Employer Liability Act (FELA)96
modifies the doctrine of contributory negligence97 to effectively function as comparative
94
Again, refer to the different types of permissive behavior possible by plaintiff, supra note 1.
95
Cutties v. Hill Top Developers, Inc., 14 Cal.App.4
,h
1651. 18 Cal.Rptr. 2d 445 (1993); Hanke v.
Wacker, 217 Ill.App. 3d 151, 576 N.E.2d 1 1 13 (1991); Swagger v. Crystal, 379N.W.2d 183 (Minn.
1985). See, generally. Annotation, Effect ofAdoption ofComparative Negligence Rules on
Assumption ofRisk, 16 A.L.R. 4
th
700, 703 §2 (1982).
96 45U.S.C. §51 etseq.
97
45 U.S.C. §53 is as follows:
Contributory negligence; diminution of damages
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no
negligence while eliminating assumption oi'risk. Other federal statutes include the
Merchant Marine Act and the Jones Act. Putting these statutes together means that
insofar as the employer-employee relationship in the railroad industry goes comparative
fault has replaced contributory negligence while secondary assumption of risk has been
completely abrogated. Congress has delineated a clear set of tracks in terms of what
In all actions hereafter brought against any such common carrier by railroad under or
by virtue of any of the provisions of this act [45 USC §§51 et seq.] to recover
damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in
his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty ofcontributory negligence
shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided,
That no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been
guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common
carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or
death of such employee (emphasis added).
In Seabord A.L.Railway v. Horton, 239 U.S. 595, 36 S.Ct. 180 (1916), the Supreme Court
made it clear that contributory negligence and assumption of risk are separate theories because
assumption of risk remained as a complete defense while contributory negligence did not. Congress
amended this act in 1939 to eliminate assumption of risk.
98
45 U.S.C. §54. The relevant portion of this section states:
[S]uch employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in
any case where such injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence
[of the railroad].
This section abrogates assumption of risk in terms of the employment relationship in
railroads. Congress added this section to avoid any confusion over whether plaintiff
acted in a manner to be considered secondary assumption of risk since the court in
Horton, supra, indicated that expressed assumption of risk still is a viable defense.
99
45 U.S.C. §688.
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defenses are, and aren't, available. This statute has no applieation outside the railroad
industry and does not apply to the several states. 100
In federal maritime law, the advent of comparative fault has also resulted in the
narrowing of assumption of risk principles. Courts have refused to consider the defense
except in circumstances where an express contract so exists. 101 As the court stated in
Whalen v. BMW ofNorth American, Inc. assumption of risk is ordinarily not available
in federal maritime law under principles of comparative fault but because a contractual
clause to the effect existed, it will be applied to bar plaintiffs claim.
103
Primary
assumption of risk (as an express contract) still has application then in this arena but
secondary assumption of risk is subsumed into comparative fault.
100
Toleda, St.L.&W.R.Co. v. Slavin, 236 U.S. 454, 35 S. Ct. 306 (1915); see also Sadowski v. Long
I.R.Co, 292 N.Y. 448, 50 NYS 2d 171 (1944).
101
Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 4 ,h 558, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 697 (1995). The court relied
on 28 U.S.C. §1333(1).
Interestingly, this is a result of following English common law in admiralty cases. Following
this common law approach gave American courts contributory negligence in all other genre of cases.
See generally, Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Historical Development, 2 Am.Jur. 2d, Admiralty §2
(1994).
102 864 F.Supp. 131 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
103
Id. The clause was part of a form signed by the plaintiff John Whalen prior to his injury in a yacht
racing contest. The clause, in pertinent part, states, "I assume any risks of injury arising out of: my
participation in the race, failure or breakage of my yacht, or any of its equipment, or weather
conditions." Id., at 132.
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As for the narrowing or erosion of assumption of risk in the states, different
results have been achieved mostly through a combination of state legislation and judicial
activism. Eight states have abolished the assumption of risk defense in the absence of an
express agreement
104
,
twenty-seven states have retained the defense as a factor in
determining respective fault
105
,
and fifteen states and the District of Columbia keep
assumption of risk as a defense regardless of whether primary or secondary is established
by the defense. 106 Of these latter fifteen, three states and DC still adhere to the principles
of contributory negligence (and thus have some valid relationship between the overlap of
1 07
secondary assumption of risk and contributory negligence).
Further compounding this issue, some of those states that have abolished
contributory negligence in favor of comparative fault still maintain that secondary
104 57B Am. Jur. 2D Negligence § 1300-1751 (1989). Those states are Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas.
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Dakota and Oregon.
105
Id. Those states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
106
Id. Those states are Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West
Virginia, Pennsylvania, DC. Furthermore, of these states, Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina and
DC still retain the use of contributory negligence.
107
Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All Or Nothing Lottery Imposed in
Intentional Tort Suits in Which Both the Plaintiffand Defendant Are At Fault, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 121,
123 n.2 (1993).
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assumption of risk, in both its forms, is still a complete bar to recovery. 10 * The argument
principally relied upon in these courts for denying recovery completely without
apportioning fault is consent by the plaintiff.
109
C. Assumption of risk's elements of confusion
In those states still applying secondary assumption of risk it is done in an
inconsistent manner. The elements of assumption of risk (i.e., knowing and voluntary)
may be defined, or ignored, so as to justify the outcome desired or the doctrine may be
overlooked altogether. Or, as demonstrated in the Decker case, ' the court (following
the plaintiffs lead in choosing it as the forum) may get lucky and be able to choose the
law that it finds appropriate to the case at hand and skirt the issue altogether. Courts have
hesitated to find any assumption of risk as a matter of law in situations where the
outcome would have a harsh outcome (or alternatively apply the doctrine regardless of its
harsh outcome) by overlooking the voluntary and knowing elements necessary for such a
defense. Also, courts have allowed the doctrine to upset or contravene a jury's finding;
such a result may come from a jury's confusion as to the implications behind the
principles it bases its findings on. At the very least, courts are aware of the possibility of
inequity through application of assumption of risk.
108
Riley v. Davidson Construction Co., 381 Mass. 432, 409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Blum v. Bhchacek,
191 Neb. 457, 215 N.W.2d 888 (1974); Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70. 376
A.2d 329 (1977).
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An examination of the consent portion of the assumption of risk equation can
i i T
reveal some incongruous results. In Conroy v. Briley, a tenant was injured while using
the stairs. In allowing her recovery, the court reasoned that the plaintiff, by using the
stairs, could have consented to the possibility of harm to herself. However, the court
went on to discuss a crucial fact: The stairs were the only means of ingress/egress for the
plaintiff. Because of this lack of choice on her part, it was found that the plaintiff
therefore did not consent to assuming the risk of harm from using the only available
means of entry into her apartment.
1 13
Consider also whether a shipper of cabbages was held to have not assumed the
risk of a defective car supplied by a carrier where the alternative was to leave the
cabbages rotting in the field, thus destroying any possibility of utility on the shipper's
part to realize profit from their sale.
1 14
The following two cases are also illustrative. In the widely discussed Eckert v.
Long Island R.R. ' l3 case, the plaintiffs deceased was killed when rescuing a child on a
railroad track as a train bore down on the child. At trial, the court refused to allow the
defendant's motion to insert a jury instruction with regard to whether a plaintiff
112
91 So.2d601 (Fla.App.1966).
113 The court stated, in part. "[T]he tenant, without any choice of a method of egress, did not assume
the risk of the danger created by the landlord." Id., at 603.
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Missouri, K&TR. Co. of Texas v. McLean, 55 Tex.Civ.App. 130, 118S.W. 161 (1909).
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voluntarily placed himself in harm's way when rescuing a child." 6 The Court of Appeals
affirmed, ignoring the issue of assumption of risk and hailing the actions of the plaintiffs
deceased. The dissent was correct when it pointed out that the plaintiffs deceased had
voluntarily and knowingly encountered a risk, therefore precluding recovery by his
estate."
8 To avoid such an inequitable result, the majority avoided the voluntary aspect
of assumption of risk altogether.
This case was distinguished by Wilson v. New York ] l9 where a brakemen, seeing
some young children running next to a moving train, attempted to get them away. He
was hit from behind by a fence post as he leaned off the rail car and killed. Although his
motives were the same as in Eckert, the court denied a possibility of recovery by his
estate, stating that the context of his heroism was not the same and that he knowingly and
voluntarily assumed the risk of harm when he attempted to keep the children away from
the moving train. In neither case can the argument be made that there was a duty to
rescue as both of the deceased did not place the children in harm's way through their own
action (or inaction). For both, rescue was voluntary only.
116
This particular outcome gave rise to the doctrine that ''danger invites rescue.
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Id., Allen, J. dissenting.
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Id.
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In Eckert, the court refused to apply assumption of risk as a corollary to the
defendant's assertion that the plaintiffs deceased acted in a contributory negligent
manner. In affirming, the Court of Appeals overlooked the issue and decided the merits
according to what they felt was the equitable outcome to the man's heroic actions. In
Wilson, the court imputed the elements of assumption of risk onto the deceased's actions,
claiming that his death is directly the result of voluntarily placing himself in harm's way.
The Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish the two rescue attempts by the
contact the rescuer had with the children: In the former case, the rescuer was able to
physically carry the child away; in the latter, the rescuer could only rely on his powers of
persuasion to get the children out of harm's way. Apparently, Wilson got broad-sided by
more than just a fence post.
This selective application of the elements of assumption of risk has expanded into
other decisions. Certainly, many courts have ignored the voluntary element of
assumption of risk in order to find that the defense did not exist to bar the plaintiffs
recovery.
1
For example, the plaintiff may have encountered a forced choice when
encountering the risk and thus there is no voluntary action on his part. In choosing the
course of action that resulted in his injury, the choice was necessary because it would
result in a meritorious outcome, such as saving a child's life in Eckert. What is really
happening here is that the courts are negating the "voluntary" aspect of assumption of
121
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risk so as to allow the plaintiff to recover. This results in assumption of the risk being
applied across the board to all plaintiffs; taking a course of action with a lack of true
alternatives doesn't necessarily mean consent.
This selective application of this tort doctrine not a uniquely American event. In
continental European legal systems which use the broader term of "fault of the injured
party" rather than contributory negligence,
124
courts have been found to be very flexible
in determining whether a plaintiff has assumed any risk or been at any fault in suits where
the defendant is more at fault. One commentator notes in general with regard to civil law-
jurisdictions in Europe:
[I]t is difficult to say how far the courts lean over backwards in order not
to "discover" contributory fault [or its corollary doctrines] and thus give
the victim his full compensation. It could be argued that they appear to be
more eager to discover fault in defendants—especially where insurance is
obligatory or prevalent—than they are to find it in plaintiffs. If this
"impressionistic" reaction is correct, and there is some authority in
England to support this... it would certainly be in tune with the more
modern trend to disregard the victim's own fault unless it is particularly
flagrant or obnoxious, and to let him recover full compensation. This
123
Contrast the results in Eckert and Wilson; the different outcomes turn on the courts' interpretations
of the voluntary encounter of a risk by the plaintiff. The minority in Eckert pointed out that plaintiff
acted voluntarily, stating: "...the company is not liable to whose who, of their own choice and with
full notice, place themselves in the path of the train and are injured." Id, at 507-08. The majority
never discussed this point.
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"Fault of the injured party" as used in civil law jurisdictions is broader than contributory
negligence in that it includes intentional behavior on the plaintiffs part. B.S. MARKESINIS, The
German Law of Torts 90 (2d ed. 1990).
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view has been officially adopted by the 1964 Soviet Civil Code and
sanctioned by the French Cour de Cassation[.]
Thus, courts around the world appreciate the inequity resulting from the
application of contributory negligence and all its concomitant doctrines.
125
Id., at 90-91.
PART IV How Assumption of Risk Conflicts with Comparative Fault
A. The subjective versus objective inquiry in application
A principle conflict with secondary assumption of risk lies in its application under
the auspices of comparative fault in its focus on the subjective knowledge plaintiff has in
encountering a known risk created by the defendant. This type of knowledge (different
from that of contributory negligence which is an objective inquiry into any departure
from a reasonable person standard) conflicts with comparative fault for the simple notion
that both parties are deemed negligent to a degree with the degree of fault on each part
tipping the scale one way or the other. The inquiry doesn't focus on subjective
knowledge but objective departure. Additionally, no inquiry is made into how
defendant's negligence was created, whether subjectively or objectively.
The problem arises because the plaintiffs behavior could be construed either
subjectively or objectively wrong, depending on how the facts are pleaded and whether
the defense affirmatively pleads secondary assumption of risk. The key here is that both
126 22 La.L.Rev. 17 (1961), supra note 13. Mansfield states in part that:
[T]he energetic attack on assumption of risk as an independent liability-limiting
doctrine has been directed mainly at those cases in which the defendant acted
negligently and then, subsequently, the plaintiff, with knowledge of the risk created
by the defendant's conduct, chose to encounter it.
* * *
Here are stripped away all the complications arising out of the need to adjust the
relations between the parties and to provide the defendant with a practical guide to
conduct."
Id, at 22.
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doctrines look to the plaintiffs behavior; one focuses on subjective and the other focuses
on objective. The distinction among the two inquires is often blurred and has caused
courts to apply the wrong principles in deciding cases, most notably at summary
1 97judgment and injury instructions. In Minnesota, for example, although the state
Supreme Court in Springrose v. Wilmore has merged secondary assumption of the risk
into contributory negligence and abolished both due to the state's adoption of
comparative fault, there is no clear authority as to whether jury instructions on secondary
assumption of risk should be given. Cases subsequent to the Springrose decision have
been upheld even though the trial court used secondary assumption of the risk language
... . 129
in the jury instructions.
127 An excellent discussion of this jury instruction confusion potential is found in Timothy Bettenga,
Note. Instructing the Jury On Comparative Fault Issues: A Current Guide To Understanding the
Nature ofComparison In Comparative Fault, 14 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 807 (1988). The discussion
points out:
There is no reason to unduly emphasize one part of the plaintiffs conduct in
instructing on secondary assumption of the risk. Such an instruction would result in
prejudice to the plaintiff, just as instructing on specific acts of the defendant's
negligence would be prejudicial to the defendant.
* * *
As secondary assumption of the risk is nothing more than a form of comparative
negligence, the courts must start treating it as such by eliminating any distinguishable
instructions to the jury. In doing so, complex comparative fault issues will be
simplified.
Id., at 822-23.
128 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W. 2d 826 (1971).
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See, generally, 14 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 807, 820, for a recitation of cases using this form ofjury
instruction.
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In Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., ' a plaintiff walked down obviously defective
steps when other steps in better condition were available at no great inconvenience to the
plaintiff. Although plaintiff (correctly) did not recover in the negligence suit, the court
labeled the plaintiffs contributory negligence as careless behavior and his implied
secondary assumption of the risk as "venturousness" in order to deny recovery to
plaintiff. Yet the court did not examine or distinguish the defendant's conduct. No
inquiry was made into the utility of the defendant's actions or the reasons why the steps
were defective, and for how long. Critics of this distinction argue that this is not a
distinction at all but an opportunity for two defenses to be plead. '
Consider the plaintiff who gets into a car with a drunk driver. If the defense is
able to show that the plaintiff knew beforehand that the driver was drunk then secondary
assumption of risk applies
—
plaintiff was subjectively aware of the danger and proceeded
in the face of it. If the defense can not show that the plaintiff knew, the principles of
objective departure still apply if facts can be shown that tend to prove that the plaintiff
should have known (a form of "willful blindness") of the danger. This objective
departure from reasonable care can be pleaded as the affirmative defense of secondary
assumption of risk.
In the example shown above with the drunk driver, two types of conduct could be
inferred based on the plaintiffs behavior. First, the plaintiff could be seen as
unreasonably accepting a ride (i.e., a date with the drunk driver) or secondly, as
130
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reasonable given the eircumstances (i.e., needing a ride due to an emergency). In either
case, a subjective inquiry would lead to two different results: The plaintiff on the date
should not have gone on the ride, or; the plaintiff had no choice but to accept that ride
given the emergency (and even worse consequences for not accepting the ride). An
objective inquiry would also lead to two different results: In the first example the
plaintiff should have known (he was on a date with the drunk driver and observed her
heavy drinking), or; in the second example, the objective result could be that the plaintiff
should not have placed herself in a situation where a getting a ride with a drunk driver
was necessary or that she had no other reasonable alternative.
B. Subjective versus objective inquiry confusion creates two defenses
Because the plaintiff is held to either an objective or subjective inquiry, the
defendant has two defenses arising from a single occurrence. The first, subjective, could
be plead affirmatively at summary judgment to deny recovery. The second, objective,
could be shown inferentially through circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff acted in a
manner inconsistent with that of an ordinary reasonable person under similar
circumstances. This type of evidence would necessitate jury instructions that would deny
recovery to the plaintiff if the jury feels there is sufficient inferential proof to show that
plaintiff acted in a manner inconsistent with an ordinary, reasonable person such that he
assumed the risk (albeit impliedly). In comparative negligence, a balance of the evidence
is weighed by the fact finder.
This conflicts with comparative fault principles that came about because of the
perceived inequities between plaintiffs and defendants during the all or nothing approach
46
of contributory negligence. With secondary assumption of risk (which courts
1 ^9
acknowledge has the characteristics of contributory negligence ) still being applied
today, comparative negligence truly has not been fully implemented.
In order to make comparative fault work properly, we must trust the trier of fact to
be able to properly balance fault of the respective parties after vigorous argument on both
sides is heard.
133
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The Model Rules of Professional Conduct states: "As an advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the
client's position under the rules of the adversary system." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Preamble, paragraph [2] (1983).
PART V The Proposal for a Comparative Responsibility Analysis
A. Introduction to the analysis
The principle contention of confusion outlined in this article is whether the court
should analyze the plaintiffs behavior in an objective (contributory negligence) standard
or a subjective (assumption of the risk) standard. In either case, the plaintiffs behavior is
examined and the defendant's conduct leading to the event is assumed to be negligent.
As discussed in the previous section, this has led to confusing outcomes and lengthy
litigation when a simple adjudication of the facts would lead to better results. A shift in
the analysis is required: It is time to weigh the balance of behaviors by each party in
determining the outcome of the suit. No longer should just the behavior by the plaintiff
be the determining factor of whether recovery should be allowed or denied.
Secondary assumption of risk as a complete defense to negligence suits needs to
be cast into a more judicially applicable manner so as to be more conducive for proper
analysis by a jury. Instead of taking what is an issue of fact away from the jury, courts
should have them decide the varying degrees of asserted negligence on each party's part
(can it ever be said that both parties are exactly equal in fault?) and a host of external
factors vital to properly allocating fault to the respective parties. Secondary assumption
of risk, whether reasonable or unreasonable, should be analyzed under a comparative
responsibility analysis model. This model is inspired by a modified risk-utility analysis
47
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promulgated for use in product defect cases. The proposed model of analysis, as
modified herein, could be used in comparative fault jurisdictions, replacing secondary
assumption of risk analysis. In those jurisdictions still following contributory negligence,
the model would have no application.
Further support for this type of comparative responsibility analysis can be seen in
Dean Wade's article (in which he calls for abrogation of the term assumption of the
risk).
1 5
In his article, he points out that in various cases where the courts wrestled with
this concept, the possibility exists for either the plaintiffs conduct or his implied consent
to be unduly extended beyond the scope of the risk purportedly assumed. He stated, in
part, that "[t]his is the test of negligence again—balancing of magnitude versus utility of
risk—and the test is much better perceived and evaluated by the use of the negligence
terminology [rather than assumption of risk]." 1 6
1. Modifying risk-utility analysis into a comparative responsibility analysis
Risk-utility in the context of product liability suits was proposed as a method to
address what was perceived to be weaknesses with the consumer expectancy test as
applied to design flaws. 137 Risk-utility analysis derived from the same school of thought
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See, e.g. 1 Am.L.Prod.Liab, § 1:49; Preliminary Draft No. 1 (April 20, 1993) Restatement (Third)
of Torts; Products Liability § 101, Reporter's Notes; O'Reilly and Cody, The Products Liability
Resource Manual (General Practice Section of the American Bar Association 1993).
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that called for the abolition of contributory negligence and was first proposed in product
defect cases for the purpose of obviating the open and obvious hazard doctrine, which
was viewed as an unjust and harsh rule to bar plaintiffs from recovery. 13 * This doctrine
was a corollary of assumption of the risk as any equipment with a dangerous condition
that is obvious to a casual user of the equipment necessarily would carry with it the
admonition that the user accepted such a risk by using the equipment anyway. Many
courts, by adopting risk-utility analysis in product defect cases, dropped the use of the
open and obvious hazard rule (which correlates to implied assumption of the risk) as a
defense.
In its application, risk-utility in products liability centers primarily around the
concept of "reasonableness" and relative responsibility.
14 To utilize this concept in the
courtroom, the manufacturer's conduct in choosing a particular product design, especially
in view of that product's risk to its users, is balanced against the utility (or usefulness) of
the product in that condition.
141 Of particular importance is the ability of the
manufacturer to eliminate the risk without diminishing the utility of that product (which
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Ogletree v. Navistar International Transport., 194 Ga.App. 41, 390 S.E.2d 61 (1989); Banks v. ICI
Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (reconsid. den.) (1994). The court held that public
policy dictate that the open and obvious rule should be done away with.
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includes the price).
142 The fact finder is given the role in these cases of considering
evidence of a reasonable design alternative at the time of the manufacture of the product
to determine whether to hold the manufacturer, seller or distributor liable for the
plaintiffs injuries resulting from the use of the product. 143 In most situations, is the
plaintiffs burden to produce such evidence of a reasonable, alternative design. 144
The Restatement (Third) of Products Liability's language with regard to
"reasonable alternative design" can be of guidance in understanding how the fact finder's
role would work in considering the utility of plaintiff and defendant's conduct. The
Restatement categorizes one form of product defect as such:
[A product] is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design... and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.
145
Building on this same form of analysis, I propose a modified form of risk-utility
analysis, couched in terms of "comparative responsibility." Much as implied assumption
of risk (as applied through the open and obvious hazard rule) was replaced with the risk-
utility analysis in product design cases, comparative responsibility would give proper
analysis to each party's role in the transaction that gave rise to the cause of action.
142
Id.
"'
Id, comment (c).
144
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Comparative responsibility analysis places more emphasis on allowing juries to weigh
comparative levels of responsibility each party has to the other, given the factors of utility
of conduct and the alternatives available to each party. The overly generic and judicially
compliant term of implied assumption of the risk would no longer be used.
Some parallels between the Restatement (Third) regarding "reasonable alternative
design" and comparative responsibility can be drawn. For example, in product defects,
the fact finder determines, based on evidence introduced by the plaintiff, whether a
reasonable alternative design was available at the time the product was manufactured or
distributed.
146 Under comparative responsibility, the fact finder's role would be similar
in that their determination of liability depends on the weighing of the utility of each
party's conduct given the circumstances and alternatives available at the time the injury
occurred. For both risk-utility analysis and comparative responsibility, the fact finder is
asked to perform role of determining responsibility from a fairness and appropriateness of
responsibility perspective.
2. Comparative responsibility's elements of analysis
146
Id, comment (b). "For the liability system to be fair and efficient, most courts agree that the
balancing of risks and benefits in judging product design and marketing must be done in light of the
knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably attainable at the time of distribution."
147
Id, comment (a). "Society benefits most when the right, or optimal, amount of product safety is
achieved. From a fairness perspective, requiring individual users and consumers to bear appropriate
responsibility for proper product use prevents careless users and consumers from being subsidized by
more careful users and consumers, when the former are paid damages out of funds to which the latter
are forced to contribute through higher product prices."
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The proposal outlined herein consists of examining the utility, or value, of each
party's conduct leading up to the injury at issue. Additionally, the alternatives available
to each party at the time of the occurrence should also be examined to ascertain whether
it diminishes or increases the utility of each party's conduct. Stated in formulaic manner,
it would resemble something like this:
(Utility ofP 's Conduct) * (Alternatives Available at Time of Occurrence) (-1)
(Utility ofD 's Conduct) * (Alternatives Available at Time of Occurrence) (- 1)
An example of this formula in determining fault for each party would be as
follows (where the plaintiff would be denied recovery): Defendant is driving on the
street to work within the speed limit when plaintiffs hat blows into the street. Plaintiff
wants to retrieve the hat and defendant is on his way to work. Both have utility for their
actions. However, plaintiff has alternatives available (because these alternatives may be
numerous X will denote the number). Two possible alternatives are to either buy a new
hat or wait for the wind to blow his hat to the other side of the street where he can cross
and retrieve it then. Illustrated by the formula, it would look something like this:
(P's Conduct = 100) * (X Alternatives Available)(-1) (D's Conduct = 100) * (0 Alternatives Available)(-1)
(100)*(-X) (100)* (0)
-lOOx
As outlined above, the plaintiffs measure of fault is (-100x) where the
defendant's measure of fault is (0). In this case, because plaintiff and defendant both had
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utility of conduct that was equal but plaintiff was presented with alternatives to the course
of action chosen, plaintiff is denied recovery.
Even if one alternative were presented to the defendant, braking the vehicle to
avoid hitting the plaintiff-pedestrian in the middle of the street, his measure of fault
would be measure as much lesser than the plaintiff due to the plaintiffs numerous
alternatives available as denoted by X above.
A. Examining the utility of each party's conduct
A an argument for examining the utility of the party's conduct in assessing fault
lies in the analogy presented by Prosser:
It is not every deliberate encountering of a known danger which is
reasonably to be interpreted as evidence of such consent [to assumption of
risk]. The jaywalker who dashes into the street in the middle of the block,
in the path of a stream of cars driven in excess of the speed limit, certainly
does not manifest consent that they shall use no care and run him down.
On the contrary, he is insisting that they shall take immediate precautions
for his safety; and while this is certainly contributory negligence, it is not
i jo
assumption of risk."
The jaywalker may possess a subjective state of mind that cars seeing him will
slow down to avoid harming him, but the utility of his conduct is very weak considering
the alternatives objectively available to him (and every other reasonable person). Thus,
the utility of rushing in to save a stranded child on the roadway will not preclude
recovery due to the utility of rescuing the child and the lack of alternatives. Rushing in to
the roadway chasing after a windswept hat has utility but there are alternatives to this
148
prosser, Torts 450 §68.
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course of action and therefore will preclude recovery. A discussion of how utility is to be
measured follows in part C.
B. Examining the alternatives available to each party
Can it ever be said that consent is given where there are no alternatives? Recall
the discussion in Part HI where the elements of assumption of risk are stretched, ignored
or twisted to suit the framework that the court feels is warranted by the facts of the
particular case. For example, in the Conroy case, where a landlord's negligence in
maintaining his tenant's only exit to the street did not impart consent on the tenant when
he was forced to use the exit for lack of other alternatives.
149
It is important then to note whether feasible alternatives are available to the
plaintiff at the time of his consent to the defendant's negligently created occurrence.
Assumption of risk differs greatly in this context of alternatives because, unlike
contributory negligence, it is (or may be) assumed that the plaintiffs behavior is always
voluntary when in fact there may not be alternatives. 150 It is in this regard whether true
149 Conroy v. Briley, 191 So.2d 601 (Fla.App.1966).
150
PROSSER, Torts 457 §68. "The term [assumption of risk] does serve to focus attention upon the
element of voluntary acceptance of the defendant's negligence, which is sometimes, but not always,
involved in contributory negligence." Thus, where there are no alternatives available to the plaintiff at
the time he encounters the negligently created event by the defendant, is his behavioral consent really
being deemed a form of contributory negligence? The problem with this, of course, is that this
concept is being applied in jurisdictions that no longer recognize contributory negligence because of
its acrimonious effects.
55
consent given viable alternatives at the time of the injury to the plaintiff has truly
occurred.
C. Applying the utility of conduct with the alternatives available
As utilized in negligence suits, comparative responsibility analysis could be
presented in a statutory form similar to the following:
Plaintiffs conduct in encountering (or assuming) the impliedly known risk
created by the defendant is to be balanced by the utility of the plaintiffs
conduct against the utility of the defendant's conduct. Factors in the
analysis of whether there is culpable negligence on each parties' side
should include: utility (usefulness) of plaintiffs conduct, utility
(usefulness) of defendant's conduct, the gravity (severity) of the danger
known to plaintiff of defendant's conduct, plaintiffs ability to avoid
defendant's conduct and the alternatives presented to plaintiff and
defendant at time of the occurrence.
If plaintiffs conduct is equal or greater in terms of negligence than with
the defendant's conduct weighing all the above factors, then plaintiff is
barred from recovery. If plaintiffs conduct is not as negligent as
defendant's with all the above factors properly considered, then plaintiffs
recovery should be reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to
plaintiff.
A comparison with the above sample statute implementing comparative
responsibility to a model comparative fault statute (below) does not reveal great
differences in effect except for the crucial elements of utility of each party's conduct and
the alternatives available at the time of the occurrence.
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act states:
151
"This is undoubtedly the most frequent error of attorneys, and even of the courts, in dealing with
the defense[s of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk]." Id., at 450.
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§ 1. [Effect of Contributory Fault].
(a) In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or
death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to
the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as
compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's
contributory fault, but does not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or
not under prior law the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense
or was disregarded under applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear
chance.
(b) "Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or
reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that
subject a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of
warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an
enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for which the defendant
otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or
to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to
fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault (emphasis
added). 152
The major difference between these two provisions is that the latter Uniform
Comparative Fault Act assigns implied assumption of risk into a category of fault that
does not necessarily terminate the plaintiffs cause of action but only diminishes her
recovery. The former provision does not attempt to categorize the different labels of fault
(formerly defenses) but assigns a general comparative responsibility scheme.
Application of the utility of conduct on each party's part is left to the jury. In
much the same manner that the jury examines the attributable fault to each person as
152
Unif. Comparative Fault Act § 1 (1977). The model statute was written by The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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outlined in the Comparative Fault model above, the jury utilizing the eomparative
responsibility analysis assigns utility towards each person's conduct. The analysis is the
same as if the jury were comparing fault; comparative responsibility asks the juror not to
allocate percentages of fault but percentages of utility. Thus, no great shift in presenting
evidence or pleading one's case to the jury occurs. Instead of attempting to convince a
jury that their opponent was wholly (or mostly) at fault the advocate makes her case that
her client's conduct has more utility than the other party's, given the alternatives
available.
This theory of comparative responsibility analysis modified from product defects'
risk-utility analysis to apply in secondary assumption of risk situations in negligence
carries more weight when economic analysis factors are considered. In economic
analysis of the law, the costs of certain conduct and the costs of those consequences (or
avoiding those consequences) are examined to determine how it fits within the current
scheme of laws. More importantly, it forms a basis for suggesting better ways to
implement or even change those laws. Indeed, a strong economic criticism of
contributory negligence that hastened its demise were the inequitable results achieved
when the party least able to bear the misfortunes of its injuries was asked to do so.
Posner's premise that risk preferrers would be willing to "trade on their taste"
by willingly waiving cost-justified precautions on the defendant's part does not mean that
plaintiffs could still have prevented injury by their own cost-justified precautions. In
other words, plaintiffs may encounter risks others do not because they may or may not
153
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have cost-justifiable alternatives available at the time of acquiescence due to the fact that
no other alternatives are available.
154
But, let's not confuse this with assuming the
risk.
155
Meshing the philosophy of economic analysis with comparative responsibility, a
clear picture of how to illustrate the interaction of plaintiff s and defendant's behavior
presents itself. In this regard, plaintiffs conduct and the utility of such conduct can be
weighed against defendant's conduct and utility of such (comparative fault principles
here) with the added factors of the utility of plaintiff s implicit agreement to assume
defendant's created risk, plaintiffs ability to avoid defendant's conduct and other
alternatives presented at the time of the behaviorally-created assumption of risk. This is
important because it enables the jury to play a role in allocating blame rather than having
the court summarily bar the plaintiffs suit.
The factors enumerated above, particularly the utility of each person's conduct
and the possibility of alternatives, better illustrate the "complete picture" of the
circumstances leading to the risks a plaintiff may have assumed and perhaps more
importantly, why. This complete picture is what should be relied upon by the jury in
allocating fault on either party and whether an award of damages is merited in the cause
of action.
5 [OJther factors, which remain to be considered, may affect the 'voluntary choice
1
; and the fact that
the risk may be assumed is by no means conclusive as to whether it has been assumed." PROSSER,
TORTS 447 §68 (emphasis in original).
155
See supra note 1.
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This balance of factors can be derived from present case law that utilize the risk-
utility analysis originates in product defect cases. Those factors incorporated the concept
of "reasonableness,"
156
which underlies the comparative responsibility analysis herein.
B. Some hypothetical examples of comparative responsibility
A plaintiff may be fully aware of one risk (and acquiescent in it) but not
necessarily fully aware of another risk which is the proximate cause of his injuries. For
example, he may be aware that a car is speeding, but not that the driver is not watching
where he is going.
Comparative responsibility analysis eliminates the need to ascertain whether the
defense of assumption of risk or contributory negligence should be plead and also the
need to have the jury consider whether the plaintiff departed from a subjective standard
(assumption of risk) or an objective standard (contributory negligence). Instead, the
utility of each party's conduct is balanced against the alternatives available to each at the
time of the injury.
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156 264 Ga. 732, 734-736. See also supra notes 135 and 136.
157
Jewell v. Schmidt. 1 Wis.2d 241, 83 N.W.2d 487 (1957); Cassidy v. Quisenberry, 346 S.W.2d 304
(Ky.1961).
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Support for this contention can be found in the dictum of the concurring opinion in Entrevia v.
Hood, 427 So.2d 1 146 (La.1983), where a person entered a dilapidated building and injured himself.
The court, in denying recovery by the plaintiff, found that he had assumed the risk based on his
subjective knowledge at the time he entered the building. The concurring opinion, while agreeing
with the outcome, was troubled by the notion that the majority found that the building posed a
reasonable risk of harm to trespassers.
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Consider this hypothetical: The guest who accepts a ride with the intoxicated
driver.
1 " 9 Assume the guest had knowledge of the driver's intoxication. After getting in
the car, the driver proceeds to have an accident proximately related to his state of
inebriation. At this point, should the driver be able to claim assumption of risk on the
part of the guest?
Using comparative responsibility analysis, the first issue to analyze is the utility
of plaintiffs conduct compared to the defendant's conduct. Here, we may have a
situation where the guest was simply looking for a ride to the local bus station. The
defendant may be driving home after consuming too many drinks at a local bar. Both
have justifiable utility for their actions, but to complete this picture we need to examine
the alternatives available to each.
In view of these alternatives, plaintiff had other opportunities for that free ride;
when presented with the choice of grabbing a ride with the drunk driver, he should have
relied on the alternative of waiting for a ride with a sober driver. The alternative
available to the intoxicated driver are plenty; a taxi ride home or a ride with a sober
Justice Watson wrote, "Clearly, the building was a ruin. As such, it had little utility and it
was likely that children, tramps or others straying on the premises might be injured. [However], if a
small child were the 'trespasser.' would not an unreasonable risk of harm be found [by the court so
that the child could recover]?" Id., at 1151.
In a subsequent decision the court expounded on this by declaring that such an analysis of
whether something posed a reasonable risk of harm by examining its utility should be based on many
factors including social, economic and moral. Oster v. Dept. of Transportation & Development, 582
So.2d 1285, 1289 (La. 1991) (Justice Kimball dissenting opinion).
b9
Admittedly, most states have abrogated the use of assumption of risk in this area but the
hypothetical still has good use.
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in an accident proximately caused by the intoxicated driver. Plaintiff sues driver; the jury
examines the evidence using comparative responsibility analysis.
Each party has utility (or usefulness) behind their actions. Plaintiff needed to go
to the hospital to save his life; defendant needed to get home (or, in the alternative, was
trying to save plaintiffs life). A survey of the alternatives available presents a more
complete picture of the negligence of each party. Plaintiff had no other feasible, realistic
alternatives. Defendant had alternatives (recalling those from the preceding scenario).
Weighing these factors in the appropriate manner, plaintiff should then be awarded
damages. The utility of plaintiffs conduct with the added analysis of the alternatives is
greater than defendant's utility of conduct and his numerously available alternatives.
(P's Conduct = 100) * (0 Alternatives)(-1) (D's Conduct = 100) * (X Alternatives)(-1)
(100)* (0) (100)* (-x)
-lOOx
In the previous examples the alternatives available to each party were examined.
In the following example the utility of each person's conduct is discussed. This example
will be the ballpark scenario.
160
The current state of affairs is to preclude a plaintiff from
receiving an award of damages based on his implied assent to the possibility of being
struck by an errant baseball bat or hockey puck.
160
Although, arguably, this scenario is moot for purposes beyond academic discussion as most
professional sports have (or should have) assumption of risk waivers on the tickets. This would create
an express contract of assumption of risk between the stadium owner(s) and the spectator.
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Each party derives utility from their actions. Plaintiff is going to go to a game for
entertainment while defendant profits from having the game performed (in this regard
their utilities are intertwined and dependant on each other). Each party has an alternative
to preventing injury. Plaintiff could stay at home and watch the game 161 or defendant
could construct costly wire mesh to completely prevent the possibility of harm to the
spectators. However, this alternative diminishes the utility of both plaintiffs and
defendant's actions.
In our example plaintiff is struck by a puck. In his suit for damages, the complete
picture of the utility of each party's actions is weighed with the alternatives available to
each. Since plaintiff derived utility from viewing the game live and defendant derived
utility from the profit of hosting the game, the alternatives available may tip the balance
toward who wins. If defendant's alternative of completely enclosing the arena with wire
meshing is viewed as having better utility than the plaintiff staying at home and watching
the game, then plaintiff wins and the defendant would be required to construct the wire
meshing. If plaintiff s utility of staying at home is viewed as less than having the
defendant enclose the arena (because the value of going to the game is diminished), then
the defendant wins.
The key to analyzing this fact pattern then is to balance the utility of each party's
actions against the alternatives available. As illustrated above, utilizing an alternative on
one person's part reduces the overall utility toward the other person. In this example, a
compromise of sorts has already been reached because of their interdependent nature.
161 Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929). Justice Cardozo in
his opinion wrote, "The timorous may stay at home."
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Baseball fields and hockey arenas have partial enclosures to protect those fans very close
to the action, but do not extend out to those areas where fans are further from the action.
This compromise has an economic premise: The value of watching the game behind a
screen is not outweighed by being struck by a 95 fastball but is outweighed by the
possibility of catching a foul ball.
For example, plaintiffs conduct prior to encountering defendant's negligently-
created risk may have an economic utility of $100 while defendant's conduct has an
economic utility of $50. In apportioning utility of conduct, it can be said that plaintiffs
behavior was twice as useful as defendant's (or 200 percent greater) and thus plaintiff
should be entitled to recover. Determination of this is left to the jury and is not based on
a hard and fast rule but rather an examination of the facts surrounding the injury. As
Prosser stated, implied assumption of the risk [in its present form] is hard to apply due to
the myriad facts in every conceivable situation that can occur.
C. Simplifying the problem of multiple defendants
Suppose Plaintiff sues three defendants: A, B, and C for damages in the amount of
$100.00. Each party has some degree of fault attributable to their actions. In
jurisdictions which apply comparative fault principles, the possibility of having to
instruct the jury on different defense principles exists in the following example. This
simple illustration of combining four defendants (one with no defense theory, two with a
theory of common negligence on the plaintiffs part and one with a defense of assumption
of risk). Where different percentages of fault are attributable to each party under
comparative responsibility but not traditional comparative fault (due to the Def. A's
" See supra note 1
.
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assertion of assumption of risk), with the possibility of damages apportionment is as
follows:
Percentage of fault Type of defense available
Plaintiff 20% Comparative fault
Def. A 30% Assumption of risk (secondary)
Def. B 30% Common negligence
Def. C 20% Common negligence
If assumption of risk is a bar to recovery from A, then the complicated issue of
whether plaintiff recovers from the other parties arises, in addition to the problem of
properly instructing the jury. And, if the plaintiff does recover, there is the possibility
that the measure of damages awarded may not be the proper amount. Under comparative
responsibility analysis, each party is allocated a percentage of fault based on the utility of
each party's conduct weighed against the alternatives available to each.
1. B and C "piggyback" on A's defense
In this hypothetical, plaintiff is now 50 percent at fault (plaintiffs 20 percent plus A's
30 percent attributed to plaintiff through his secondary assumption of risk). In modified
comparative negligence jurisdictions, B and C walk away from the cause of action as
their level of fault together would not surpass the 50 percent threshold plaintiff needs to
overcome in order to recover.
163
In most jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions would allow for recovery if plaintiff is not more negligent
than defendant(s). Here, it is assumed that plaintiff recovers nothing since his damages, reduced in the
amount of 50 percent of the total, are equivalent to plaintiffs own proportion of damages incurred
without compensation.
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The conclusive effect of B and C acting in a negligent manner without providing
compensation for the injury caused is similar to contributory negligence. Recall that
plaintiff never recovers if there is any fault, however slight that may be, on his part. This
defeats the policy reasons for the demise of contributory negligence, as discussed in Part
III. With the principles of contributory negligence still prevalent in secondary
assumption of risk analysis, it is very possible that B and C could "piggyback" on A's
defense to completely deny recovery on the plaintiffs part.
2. Jury confusion potential
Even if plaintiff is able to recover at law against B and C they still may not have to
pay their share of damages either due to possible confusion on the part of the trier of fact
during deliberations. Here, A has an affirmative defense while B and C must plead that
the evidence shows their conduct has not risen to a level of negligence. The fact finder in
this situation is asked to consider the plaintiffs behavior in two different contexts: First,
the subjective standard of whether he acted in a reasonable manner when he encountered
defendant A's negligently created event and second, the objective reasonable person
standard of ordinary negligence.
It is very possible that the fact finder may "carry over" the analysis of the plaintiffs
behavior into the analysis of whether B and C were negligent. If, for example, the trier of
fact considers that the plaintiff acted in an unreasonable manner when encountering the
negligently created event of A, it is entirely possible that this behavior will be imparted
against the plaintiff in considering the negligence of B and C even though the affirmative
defense no longer applies. In some jurisdictions courts refuse to submit separate
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instructions for assumption of risk and comparative negligence finding the potential for
confusion too great.
3. The proper measure of damages may not be awarded
Finally, consider whether plaintiff will receive the proper measure of damages.
Ideally, given that plaintiff is 20 percent at fault and A, B, and C are assumed to be
jointly and severally liable for the remaining 80 percent of damages, the most plaintiff
should receive is $80.00. Also, plaintiff may only recover $50.00 if the trier of fact finds,
using comparative responsibility analysis, that A's conduct had more utility than
plaintiffs given the alternatives available at the time of the event. In either case, the
minimum award would be $50.00.
However, if the trier of fact relies on the secondary assumption of risk analysis now
used in comparative fault courts, plaintiff faces the prospect of recovering either $50.00
or nothing at all. The return of no award could be due to either the results achieved in
scenarios 1 and 2, discussed above. In either situation, the policy principles behind
comparative fault would be defeated.
Looking to comparative responsibility analysis, plaintiffs utility of conduct is
weighed against A, B, and C. For B and C, the utility of conduct on plaintiffs part
outweighs B and C's utility since their behavior violated common negligence principles.
As for A, the analysis would be the same, where each party's utility of conduct is
weighed against the other with added weight given to the alternatives available to
plaintiff and A at the time the event occurred. This analysis then would have two
164
Annotation, Effect ofAdoption ofComparative Negligence Rules on Assumption ofRisk, 16 A.L.R.
4
,h
700. 703 §2(1982).
Plaintiff 20%
A 30%
B 30%
C 20%
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outcomes: Either plaintiff recovers against A or he doesn't. In either case, the measure
of damages allocated to plaintiff from all three parties would be the proper amount
($80.00 if A liable to plaintiff; $50.00 if A is not liable to plaintiff). Refer to the chart
below (total amount of damages being equal to $100.00):
Percentage of fault Type of defense available A liable A not liable
Comparative respons. analysis -$20.00 -$20.00
Comparative respons. analysis +30.00 -$30.00
Common negligence +$30.00 +$30.00
Common negligence +$20.00 +$20.00
D. Revisiting the four introductory cases
This article began with four cases highlighting problems in the area of applying
secondary assumption of risk. This subsection re-examines the outcomes of those cases
using comparative responsibility.
1. The case of the thwarted verdict, revisited 165
Mr. Harris recovered damages of $90,000 in this case but was denied recovery
even though he was found only 15 percent at fault because the jury construed his
percentage as secondary assumption of the risk. The trial court, despite its obvious
reluctance to do so and the jury's intention, upheld complete denial of damages on the
defense's motion.
165
Harris v. Hercules Incorporated, 328 F.Supp. 360 (Ark. 1971).
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Using comparative responsibility analysis, the critical element of analysis lies
with the alternatives available to the parties. Mr. Harris, as an employee of the defendant
Hercules Incorporated, had no alternatives available because he was hired to do the work
and he was led to believe that the line he was working near was de-energized. The
alternative of not working on the line is irrelevant because it would cause Mr. Harris to
lose his job, something he would not reasonably wish to do given the fact that he thought
the power line was safe to be near. Hercules, on the other hand, had the alternative of de-
energizing the power line or not sending its employees near unsafe lines. In using
comparative responsibility, Hercules would be at fault for 100 percent of the damages
due to the fact that it failed to use an available alternative to avoid creating a situation of
risk to the plaintiff.
166
Using the proposal herein, the jury would not have to assign percentage values of
fault that were probably arrived at in a somewhat arbitrary manner. As a factual matter,
the jury would simply weigh the alternatives available along with the utility of conduct
(as discussed above) to reach the conclusion that Hercules was responsible for the
injuries. Clearly, in the actual findings the jury's desire to award Mr. Harris a majority
percentage of damages was contravened by the confusing jury instructions that utilized
the phrase, "assumption of risk." This confusion served as the death knell for any
recovery by Mr. Harris at all.
166 To reach this outcome, it is assumed that each party has sufficient utility for their actions. Harris
was a paid employee assigned to complete a task and Hercules gained profit from its employees
performing certain services. This assessment of utility within this proposal, as always, is a factual
issue decided by the jurors.
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2. The case of the sentient eight-year old, revisited 167
Utilizing a far-fetched notion of secondary assumption of risk, the court denied
recovery by the Harvards against the Stewarts when they left an eight-year old boy alone
in their house because they found that he had assumed the risk of his death when he
played with matches in an empty house, save for another boy, aged ten. They held the
deceased boy has significant appreciation for the causal chain of events that could lead to
his death.
Under comparative responsibility, the issue would have gone to the jury. The
factors of utility of conduct and alternatives available would be tried. In this case, there
is arguably no utility of conduct in playing with matches and certainly some utility for the
actions of the persons who were away from their house at the time (shopping, working, et
cetera).
Alternatives again are crucial however. The Stewarts had the alternative of
sending Scott Harvard home before they left the house. They could have informed his
parents that they were leaving him there alone with their ten-year old son, giving them
the opportunity to bring him home. One could have stayed with the two boys while the
other left to do what needed done outside the house. As for the boys alone in the house,
they had the alternative of not playing with matches. But, is this a realistic alternative,
given the fact that boys at this age need parental supervision because they lack full
capacity for their actions?
167
Stewart v. Harvard, et al., 239 Ga.App. 388, 520 S.E. 2d 752 (1999).
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In this case, the alternatives tip against the Stewarts. By not utilizing their choice
of alternatives, they effectively failed under comparative responsibility analysis to keep
Scott from dying in the resulting fire.
3. The case of the thwarted verdict, part II, revisited 168
Sammie Jones became seriously injured when he stuck his arm in a running snow
blower while his attention was diverted to two young girls walking by. He recovered
damages against the manufacturer and no assumption of the risk charge was ever read
into the jury instructions.
Under comparative responsibility, Mr. Jones would not have recovered. Although
he had some utility for his conduct by attempt to dislodge whatever was jamming the
snow-blower with a stick he picked up nearby, he had easily available alternatives to him.
First, he could have turned off the machine. Second, he could have paid more attention
to what he was doing as he stuck the tree branch inside the blower. Third, he could have
called a qualified repairman.
Defendant, on the other hand, utilized its alternatives readily available. It warned
users of its product that sticking body parts inside the machinery while it was operating
was potential harmful. Other warnings made it clear that great risk came to those who
did not operate the machine in a safe manner. Mr. Jones himself acknowledged that these
alternatives did in fact occur.
169
168
Jones v. M.T.D. Products, Inc., 507 F.Supp. 8 (Penn. 1980).
169 He admitted he never read the operating manual but did acknowledge that there was danger in his
actions. 507 F.Supp. 8, 10 (Penn. 1980).
72
4. The case of the well-chosen rule of law, revisited
This was a diversity suit brought in Wisconsin by a Pennsylvania resident for an
injury that occurred at him using a machine he bought in Pennsylvania. The federal court
used a tenuous connection at best to justify applying Wisconsin's rule of law
(comparative fault) over Pennsylvania law (contributory negligence). They accomplished
this through the use of a conflict of laws rule that has been criticized for being to
manipulative at best. 171 The motivating factor behind the court's decision was to avoid
unjust and harsh results from the application of an unjust rule.
The problem with this was the willingness to give the plaintiff a chance to
proceed under a negligence cause of action without much regard to the merits of his
claim. For, despite those merits, had the court chosen Pennsylvania law, plaintiff would
have been completely barred had the defendant shown any fault on the plaintiffs part at
all. Those focus, rather than being on the suit itself, was on the avoidance of premature
dismissal of the suit altogether.
Comparative responsibility avoids this result as there are~no all or nothing rules of
contributory negligence to apply, even the underlying defense of implied secondary
assumption of risk. Without having to focus on inequitable results that could attain, the
170
Decker v. Fox River Tractor Co., 324 F.Supp. 1089 (Wis. 1971).
171
Professor Leflar's five choice influencing factors, as used by the court in Wisconsin, are often
criticized as indefinite and uncertain since the five factors can be evaluated differently by different
states. See Cavers, THE CHOICE OF LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS, 207 (1985); Kay, Theory into Practice:
Choice ofLaw in the Courts, 34 Mercer L. Rev. 521 (1983).
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court instead could locus more on the merits of the claim itself, instead of trying to seek
the rule with the least harsh possible outcome.
Part VI. Criticisms of the Comparative Responsibility Analysis
A principle criticism of this approach advocated in this Article is that
"cooperative negligence" of the parties should not allow the plaintiff to recover. When
plaintiff is injured by the concurrent negligent acts of himself and the defendant, he
should not be able to recover.
172 To this criticism, the proper response is to consider the
principles that led to the decline of contributory negligence itself and the balance
proposed herein. In an instance where cooperative negligence has occurred (where each
party has either 100 percent or utility, concurrently), the alternatives to the negligent
behavior are also examined to arrive at the proper allocation of fault on each part. Also,
this logic may assume that each party is equally at fault; again, an examination of
alternatives available to each party would properly allocate fault on either side.
Another criticism is that plaintiffs may be rewarded for their bad behavior.
Proponents of contributory negligence emphasize their belief that plaintiffs who receive
any measure of damages would not be vigilant in their own safety. The response is two-
fold: First, it would be an assumption that goes against the grain of human nature to
think that a person would not look after his own personal safety simply because, if they
hurt themselves, they can recover 20 cents on the dollar for their pain and suffering.
Second, with regard to the proposal outlined in this article, the utility of plaintiff s
behavior, compared to defendant's, with the proper analysis of alternatives available to
172 Menger v. Lauer, 55 N.J.L. 205, 26 A. 180 (1893); Herrell v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 324
Mo. 38. 23 S.W.2d 102(1929).
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each, would still give us the correct determination of fault on each side. For example, the
plaintiff who rushes into the street to save a child has acted badly, but the alternatives
(serious injury to the child) outweigh this fault. Conversely, rushing into the street to
save a hat has some utility, but this is greatly outweighed by the alternatives available
(buying a new hat versus potentially paying thousands of dollars in medical expenses).
A compelling criticism may be that judicial activism would be required to
implement these principles since state legislatures have been silent on this issue. 17j
Admittedly, a major issue in resolving the problems that secondary assumption of risk
presents in the courtroom is, short of statutory implementation, that it will require judicial
activism to have the analysis imparted in the process.
Critics of this cringe at the thought of the bench creating new laws and abrogating
those already in place. But, consider this notion: Contributory negligence is a judicially
created doctrine.
174
In their attempts to modernize or ameliorate the harsh effects of
contributory negligence, the courts fashioned many exceptions to the rule. This practice
became known as the Erosion Principle. 5 Over time, confusing rules and ever more
confusion in the application of these rules were created.
J
Dean Wade, Comments on Maki v. Frelk
—
Comparative vs. Contributory Negligence: Should the
Court or the Legislature Decide?, 21 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 889 (1968). The article suggests that the
common-law adversary system where one party should win and the other should lose rewards use of
contributory negligence because apportioning damages is "unworthy of the common law and suitable
only for the untutored lay mind or perhaps occasionally in equity." However, the author overlooks the
fact that contributory negligence itself is a judicially created doctrine.
174
Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 463 (1962).
175
PROSSER, ET al., TORTS 569-572 (9
th
Ed. 1994).
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By contrast, most of the forty-six states that have adopted comparative negligence
schemes have done so through legislation. As for those states that did adopt comparative
fault through judicial activism, the state legislatures followed with statutes. 176 It seems
that the courts, absent legislative action, were unable to leave contributory negligence
behind unless compelled to do so by either their state legislators or the overwhelming
force ofjurisdictional pull. 1 In one compelling example of hesitation in absence of
legislation, Tennessee recognized that contributory negligence could operate to thwart
justice yet waited nearly 16 years to find the proper opportunity to change to comparative
fault.
178
176
Id., at 578.
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Alabama probably bests exemplifies this reluctance to act without legislative authorization. In a
recent opinion, the court, despite overwhelming reasons to do so and support from academicians and
other jurisdictions, stated:
We have heard hours of oral argument; we have read numerous briefs; we have
studied cases from other jurisdictions and law review articles; and in numerous
conferences we have discussed at depth this issue and all of the ramifications
surrounding such a change. After this exhaustive study and these lengthy
deliberations, the majority of the Court, for various reasons, has decided that we
should not abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence, which has been the law
in Alabama for approximately 162 years.
Williams v. Delta International Machine Corp., 619 So.2d 1330 (Ala.1993).
178
Mclntyre v. Ballantine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992). The Supreme Court of Tennessee, making
reference to an earlier decision, announced when it finally adopted comparative negligence that
"[s]uch a case is before us."
The earlier decision was Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576 (Tenn. 1976). The court had this
to say when asked to adopt comparative negligence:
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It should not be overlooked as well that a form ofjudicial "non-activism" has
occurred in this arena. For years, courts have acknowledged that plaintiffs have received
favorable jury verdicts despite evidence to the contrary (such evidence showing
contributory negligence). These so-called "compromise verdicts" are a fact of the court
system that has been acknowledged for some time.
17
The problem with these compromise verdicts is that the jury is doing what the
court is unwilling to do: Awarding damages in a case that the evidence shows should not
be done due to some form of contributory negligence on the plaintiffs party that should
prevent an award otherwise. If the courts were to acknowledge that comparative fault
should completely abrogate all forms of assumption of risk (except primary) and take
steps to do so, then these types of verdicts would not be necessary. Choose your lesser
evil: Compromise verdicts or judicial activism.
An interesting example ofjudicial activism occurred in the civil law jurisdiction
of Germany. After the enactment of a statute to allow for apportionment of damages 180
,
We do not deem it appropriate to consider making such a change unless and until a
case reaches us wherein the pleadings and proof present an issue of contributory
negligence accompanied by advocacy that the ends of justice will be served by
adopting the rule of comparative negligence.
Id., at 586.
179
Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955) provides an excellent example of this in its
dictum.
180
§ 254 BGB (F.R.G.) (German Civil Code). This code section provides:
If any fault of the injured party has contributed to causing the damage, the obligation
to compensate the injured party and the extent of the compensation to be made
depends upon the circumstances[.]
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the Supreme Court of Germany swung away from application of the statute and began
considering cases of contributory negligence to bar claims under a statute that governed
unlawful tortious acts . In effect, the Court began to find that plaintiffs who assumed
the risk of their injuries were acting in an unlawful manner.
The Supreme Court changed this approach because of its harsh results and once
again began applying the statute intended to cover situations where assumption of the risk
occurs, § 254. This code section is viewed as more flexible because it allows an
allocation of the damages between the parties.
Consider also the bold move of the courts in the state of Georgia. They took the
bold step of expanding a statute once applicable only to railroads into a rule of law
applicable in all negligence cases.
Finally, critics may point out that litigation would become increasingly complex
with regard the comparative responsibility analysis proposed. However, a counterpoint
to this criticism is that it may encourage settlement by the parties. Instead of going
This is a very flexible approach.
181
§ 823(1) BGB (F.R.G.) (German Civil Code). This code section provides:
[1] A person who, willfully or negligently, unlawfully injures [another] is bound to
compensate hime for any damage arising therefrom.
182 BGHZ 34, 355 (363). The Supreme Court no longer considered assumption of the risk to be
unlawful behavior but rather as behavior that could reduce damages under § 254. See also, 2 JULIUS
Von Stauzinger, Kommentar Zum BUrgerlichen Gesetzbuch—Recht Der
SchuldverhAltnisse (A Commentary on the German Civil Code—Law of Obligations), 5
Teil, 2871 (ll
th
ed. 1975).
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forward on an all or nothing suit, the parties would be encouraged to reach a compromise
and settle. This would have the net effect of reducing personal injury cases in the court
system and creating a more streamlined approach to litigation. The trend toward
mediation and other forms of alternate dispute resolution underscore that this approach
would work well.
1 QT
" Goodrich, Origin ofthe Georgia Rule ofComparative Negligence and Apportionment ofDamages,
Ga. Bar. A. J. 174(1940).
PART VII Conclusion
Comparative fault jurisdictions presently face confusion in applying implied
assumption of the risk to negligence suits. The confusion centers around the courts'
attempt to find some acknowledgement or agreement for the plaintiff to assume risk
based on her behavior alone. The traditional elements of assumption of risk, knowingly,
voluntarily and full appreciation of the risk involved, are often overlooked or created at
summary judgment level in barring a claim or allowing it to continue to trial. As the
cases in the Introduction illustrate, there is inconsistency as to whether a case will
proceed to trial or whether the plaintiff will recover damages even though already
awarded. Some plaintiffs have even used this confusion to their advantage in
determining which jurisdiction to file suit in.
Where an express agreement is lacking, comparative responsibility attempts to
eliminate this confusion. Based on a modified form of risk-utility analysis promulgated
in products liability cases, comparative responsibility is applicable in situations where
there is an absence of a clear agreement (such as a waiver of liability) to assume the risks
of a given activity. The model presents an analysis of the utility of each party's conduct
against the alternatives available to each at the time of the activity to determine the scope
of fault attributable to each. Such a determination is to be made by a jury. The model
also eliminates the presumption that, where both parties acted unreasonably, the plaintiff
acted in a more unreasonable manner than the defendant and thus assumed the risk.
Under this model, secondary implied assumption of risk would be fully subsumed
into the principles of comparative fault already being applied in the vast majority of the
80
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United States and civil law jurisdictions throughout the world. A comparative fault
jurisdiction that utilizes the analysis presented herein would find that the maxim "volunti
non fit injuria" would apply only to express agreements of willingness, and not to the
subjective analysis of behavior alone.
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Appendix A
Chart of Different Forms of Assumption of Risk
Express
What it is: A prior agreement of release
from liability for damages sustained during
the agreed upon activity
Consequences: Risk of negligence shifts
from the D to the P. D relieved of burden of
use of reasonable care.
Defeated by: Public policy considerations;
D may not use gross, wanton or reckless
behavior.
Examples: Participation in certain sporting
events, waiver of release (i.e. contract).
Adoption of comparative fault has no effect
on availability of this theory to bar P's
recovery from D.
Implied, 2 types
Primary
What it is: According to Arthur Best, Comparative
Negligence: Law and Practice (1993), when a plaintiff
is fully cognizant of and voluntarily encounters a risk
without expressly consenting to it, nonetheless an
implication of assent still occurs.
Consequences: There can be no cause of action for
negligence as the P's actions absolved D of any duty owed.
Cts. Also construe this to mean that D owed no duty
because of P's knowledge when encountering the known
risk.
Defeated by: Public policy considerations or if D acts in a
gross, wanton or reckless manner.
Examples: Being struck by an accidentally flung bat at a
baseball game; inherent dangers ("the danger of falling trees
lurks in all wooded... areas," Walls v. Lueking, 332 S.W.2d
692 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1959), cert. Denied. Some cts. also use
this for participants in contact sports.
Adoption of comparative fault has led AK, GA, NE, RI, SD
to abolish this theory as a defense [Best, §4.20[2][b][i]].
Secondary, 2 types (reasonable & unreasonable)
What it is: "A thorn in the judicial side," Blackburn v.
Dorta, 348 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla.1977). Occurs when a P
voluntarily and knowingly meets a risk negligently created
by the D. Very similar to contributory negligence (which is
no longer used by the cts.).
Consequences: Bars recovery by the P.
Defeated by: Public policy considerations; whether D's
negligence was sufficiently greater that P's so as to allow
recovery by P (comparative negligence principles).
Examples: Construction worker stepping outside of clearly
marked site to urinate and struck by drunk driver speeding
on highway.
Adoption of comparative fault has led many jurisdictions to
clamor for abolishing this theory.
Reasonable
Occurs when P's conduct
in assuming the risk was
reasonable.
Unreasonable
Occurs when the P's conduct
in assuming the risk deemed
as unreasonable.
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